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CHAPTER 5 
Torts 
JAMES W. SMITH* 
§5.1. Introduction. Most of the 1976 Survey year developments 
in Massachusetts tort law were judicial. By far, the most significant 
was the abolition of interspousaP and parent-child immunity2 from 
negligence claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. This area is 
separately treated in detail in this volume. 3 In other areas, the 
Commonwealth's appellate courts ruled on such matters as: the extent 
of an attorney's privilege in a libel action;4 whether a nuisance claim 
may exist for conduct having legislative approval;5 the degree of cer-
tainty required in proving damages in an action for interference with 
contractual relations;6 and whether the common law duty of ordinary 
care, established in Mounsey v. Ellard,7 extends to the guest in an 
automobile.s Also receiving judicial attention were problems of 
"no-fault,"9 proximate cause,10 and landlord and tenantY 
§5.2. Libel: Attorney's Absolute Privilege. The basis for priv-
ilege in libel is that the right of the individual not to be defamed must 
occasionally give way to a greater social need. A privilege is either ab-
solute or conditional depending upon the importance of the particu-
* JAMES W. SMITH is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
§5.1. I Lewis v. Lewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1764,351 N.E.2d 526. 
2 Sorensen v. Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3662, 339 N.E.2d 907. 
3 See § 5.10 infra. 
4 Striberg v. Raymond, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 961, 345 N.E.2d 882, discussed at § 5.2 
infra. 
o Hub Theatres, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1031,346 
N.E.2d 371, discussed at § 5.3 infra. 
6 National Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1472, 348 N.E.2d 
771, discussed at § 5.4 infra. 
7 363 Mass. 693, 297 N .E.2d 43 (1973), discussed in Student Comment, 1973 ANN. 
SlJRV. MASS. LAW § 11.17, at 325-49. 
8 Paduano v. Tefft, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1744,351 N.E.2d 210, discussed at § 5.7 infra. 
9 Flaherty v. The Travelers Insurance Co., 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 100,340 N.E.2d 888, 
discussed at § 5.5 infra, and Scandura v. Trombly Motor Coach Serv., Inc., 1976 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1752,351 N.E.2d 202, discussed at § 5.6 infra. 
10 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 909, 345 N.E.2d 
683, discussed at § 5.8 infra. 
11 Perry v. Medeiros, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 621, 343 N.E.2d 859, discussed at § 5.9 
infra. 
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lar need. If absolute, the privilege protects even ithe malicious pub-
lisher; when conditional, malice destroys the privilege. l Statements by 
a party, counsel, or witness in the institution of, or during the course 
of, a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged provided such 
statements relate to that proceeding.2 A statement may relate to the 
proceeding, and thereby remain privileged, even ~hough the speaker 
knows the statement is false. 3 : 
In a case decided during the Survey year, Sriberg v. Raymond,4 the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that this absolute privilege incident to 
the institution and conduct of judicial proceedings extends to an 
attorney's statement made in a letter threatening .he commencement 
of litigation.5 The plaintiff in Sriberg was president jand majority stock-
holder of a corporation that contracted to buy stofk in a corporation 
represented by the defendant-Iawyer. 6 Upon the plaintiffs refusal to 
complete the transaction, the defendant-lawyer sent an allegedly de-
famatory letter7 threatening litigation to the pillintiff and to the 
Shawmut Credit Corporation, an escrow agent.8 iThe plaintiff com-
menced an action for libel in the United States Di~trict Court for the 
District of Massachusetts, which court certified the following question 
to the Supreme Judicial Court: "Is an allegedly defamatory statement 
absolutely privileged under the law of Massachusetts when it is con-
tained in a communication mailed by an attorney ito a person against 
whom, the communication indicates, the attornet is threatening to 
bring a lawsuit?"9 
In answering the question in the affirmative, the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Sriberg adopted the view of the Restatement of Torts, that 
"[a]n attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish false and de-
famatory matter of another in communications prjeliminary to a pro-
posed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, dr during the course 
and as part of a judicial proceeding in which he participates as coun-
sel, if it has some relation thereto."lo The Court tempered its finding 
§5.2. 1 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 114, at 776-77 (4th ed. 
1971). 
2 Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 72-73, 256 N.E.2d 442, 443 (1970); Seelig v. Har-
vard Cooperative Society, 355 Mass. 532, 538, 246 N.E.2d 642, 646 (1969); Mezullo v. 
Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 236, 118 N.E.2d 356, 358 (1954). 
3 Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 73, 256 N.E.2d 442, 443 (1970). 
4 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 961, 345 N.E.2d 882. 
5 !d. at 964, 345 N.E.2d at 883. 
6 [d. at 962, 256 N.E.2d at 882-83. 
7 The defendant-lawyer's letter stated in part: 
Your persistence, against this backdrop, of a meritorious basis for repudiation is a 
sha~. Your conduct in this respect is reckless, willful and malicious .... It is quite 
obVIOUS that you now are attempting to appropriate [my client's] business without 
payment .... If these demands are not met, suit will be instituted .... 
[d. at 963, 256 N.E.2d at 883. 
8 [d. 
9 [d. at 961-62, 256 N.E.2d at 882. 
1(1 [d. at 964, 256 N.E.2d at 883, quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 586 (1938). The 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974), retains essentially 
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of absolute immunity slightly, however, by also adopting the reasoning 
of a comment to the Restatement (Second) of Torts that the com-
munication must have some relation to a proceeding that is contem-
plated in good faith and under serious considerationY Comment e to 
the Restatement (Second) states that "[t]he bare possibility that such a 
proceeding might be instituted is not to be used as a cloak to provide 
immunity for defamation when the possibility [of instituting such a 
proceeding] is not seriously considered."12 
The absolute privilege, requiring as it does the individual to sur-
render an important right even in the face of malice, should be spar-
ingly granted. In the case of a judicial proceeding, the ultimate pro-
cedure in our society for the settlement of disputes, it is critical that 
every effort be exerted to reach the truth. Witnesses and counsel 
should not hold back out of fear that their statements may lead to 
defamation suits. This social goal necessitates an extreme measure, the 
absolute privilege. The extension of the absolute privilege, however, 
to prelitigation statements seems unwarranted. What takes place prior 
to litigation is not a controlled procedure for arriving at the truth but 
a joust, often involving a great deal of bluffing, where reputations 
may be lost by the attempts of the unscrupulous to obtain a favorable 
position for settlement purposes. Statements made in pleadings,13 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, or during trial are 
subject to control. Judicial presence deters the unscrupulous attorney 
from taking advantage of his absolute privilege. No such protection 
exists with respect to communications made prior to the commence-
ment of an action. 
The Sriberg result raises several questions. First, what persons have 
a sufficient interest in the threatened litigation to be entitled to re-
ceive a copy of the defamatory statements? In Sriberg, for example, a 
copy of the allegedly defamatory letter was sent to the Shawmut Cred-
it Corporation.14 The Court's implicit conclusion that the defendant-
lawyer did not thereby forfeit his absolute immunity is probably jus-
tified because Shawmut, as an escrow agent15 and potential 
defendant,16 was interested in the threatened lawsuit. There is a 
danger, however, that in another situation an attorney, enjoying ab-
the same language as the earlier version, although for some unknown reason the word 
"false" has been deleted. 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 965-66, 256 N.E.2d at 884, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 586, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). 
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586, comment e. 
13 MASS. R. CIY." P. II(a) requires that every pleading of a party represented by an at-
to\'ney be signed by a Massachusetts attorney. Such signature constitutes a certificate by 
the attorney that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, in-
formation, and belief there is a good ground to support it. An attorney may be subject 
to disciplinary action for a willful violation of the rule. 
14 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 963, 256 N.E.2d at 883. 
10 [d. at 962,256 N.E.2d at 883. 
16 [d. at 963, 256 N.E.2d at 883. 
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solute immunity from suit, and uncontrolled by any judicial presence, 
will send copies of defamatory suit-threatening letters to persons with 
borderline interests in the matter in order to coerce I a settlement. Sec-
ond, does the person defamed also enjoy an absolute privilege in his 
or her response to the attorney's defamatory statem~nts? Finally, why 
is the social olicy of permitting attorneys com pie freedom of ex-
pression in their efforts to secure justice for their clients any more 
important when litigation is contemplated than when it is not? 
§5.3. Nuisance: Legislative Authority Defense. i In Hub Theatres, 
Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority,! the Supreme Judicial Court recon-
sidered the impact of legislative authorization of defendants' activities 
upon the availability of nuisance actions. 2 In 1955 the owner of prop-
erty in East Boston constructed a drive-in theatre apbroximately 2,500 
feet away from Logan Airport.3 Subsequently, the fIand and theatre 
were leased to Hub Theatres, Inc. In 1959 the Massachusetts Port Au-
thority took control of Logan Airport and, purs)Jant to statutory 
authority,4 expanded the airport. This expansion re~ulted in the pres-
ence of low flying aircraft over the theatre. The inevitable noise, vi-
brations, and fumes forced Hub Theatres, Inc. to discontinue its opera-
tions. Hub Theatres, Inc. sued the Massachusetts Pqrt Authority on a 
nuisance theory. The complaint was dismissed by tpe superior court 
and an appeal taken.s The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the entry 
of judgment for defendant on the ground that generally the Legisla-
ture may authorize activities that would otherwise bel a nuisance.6 
To prevail in a nuisance action in Massachusetts al plaintiff must es-
tablish that the defendant's conduct which interferes with plaintiffs 
use and enjoyment of his property is (1) intentional and unreasonable, 
or (2) actionable under the tort theories of negligen<je or strict liability 
based upon ultrahazardous conduct. 7 When a nuisance action is based 
upon a claim that defendant's activity is intentional and unreasonable, 
unreasonableness does not require proof of negligjence. Rather, the 
court, assuming the defendant's conduct is intention~l, determines the 
existence or nonexistence of a nuisance and sets the appropriate 
§5.3. I 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1031,346 N.E.2d 371. 
"For earlier consideration of this issue see, e.g., Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 
270 Mass. 511, 523, 170 N.E. 385, 390 (1930); Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239, 241-42 
(1884). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 91, at 606-07 (4th ed. 
1971). 
3 Hub Theatres, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1032, 346 N.E.2d at 373. 
• See Acts of 1956, c. 465, § 5. 
5 Hub Theatres, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1032, 346 N.E.2d at 372. 
6/d. at 1034, 346 N.E.2d at 373. 
[W]hen the Legislature directs or allows that to be done which t'0uld otherwise be 
a nuisance, it will be valid, upon the ground that the Legislature is ordinarily the 
proper judge of what the public good requires, unless carried to such an extent 
that it can fairly be said to be an unwholesome and unreasonablf: law. 
[d., quoting Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239, 241-42 (1884). 
7 See Ted's Master Serv., Inc. v. Farina Bros. Co., 343 Mass. 307, 312, 178 N.E.2d 268, 
271 (1961), noted in Smith, Torts, 1962 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 3.3, at 37-38. 
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remedy8 by balancing three general considerations: (1) the suitability 
of the area for the type of activity that defendant is conducting; (2) 
the social utility of defendant's conduct; and (3) the gravity of the 
harm to plaintiff.9 The "intentional" nature of defendant's conduct 
merely requires a finding that he was aware that the invasion was re-
sulting or was substantially certain to result from his activity.10 
The Hub Theatres decision will have no effect on nuisance actions 
based on negligence or strict liability. The Court stated that the plain-
tiffs did not allege that the Port Authority had been negligent in car-
rying out its business at Logan AirportY In addition, the operation of 
an airport is not ultrahazardous activity leading to strict liability. 12 
With respect to nuisance actions based on intentional and unreasona-
ble activity, however, the essence of the holding in Hub Theatres seems 
to be that the Legislature had made a decision that the activity, on bal-
ance, was reasonable. Thus, absent a showing that the Legislature had 
exceeded its authority by enacting a clearly unreasonable, and there-
fore unconstitutional, statute, or that the activity was carried out in a 
negligent or ultrahazardous fashion, the judkiary cannot interfere 
wit.h the Legislature's decision by declaring the activity a compensable 
nUIsance. 
While the result in Hub Theatres barred recovery by the plaintiff-
lessee, the Court indicated that the owner of the property affected is 
not necessarily without remedy. In this context, the Court pointed out 
that if the interference with the plaintiffs land was sufficiently sub-
stantial to constitute a taking or condemnation of the property, he 
could recover reasonable compensation.13 An opposite result in Hub 
Theatres might well have allowed the nuisance action to circumvent 
limitations in the eminent domain laws. 14 The unfairness of requiring 
8 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS. ch. 40, introductory note, at 223-24 (1938). 
9 See Pendoley v. Ferreria, 345 Mass. 309, 314, 187 N.E.2d 142, 146 (1963); Cumber-
land Corp. v. Metropoulos, 241 Mass. 491, 502, 135 N.E. 693, 696 (1922). See generally 
Pattersonv. Peabody Coal Co., 3 Ill. App. 2d 3Il, 316-18, 122 N.E.2d 48,51-52 (4th 
Dist. 1954); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 826-28 & Comments (1938). 
10 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 825, comment a (1938). 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1035,346 N.E.2d at 374. 
12 See id. at 1035, 346 N.E.2d at 374; Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 
5Il, 525, 170 N.E. 385, 391 (1930). For an example of an ultrahazardous activity, see 
Hakkila v. Old Colony Broken Stone & Concrete Co., 264 Mass. 447, 162 N.E. 895 
(1928) (blasting). 
13 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1036,346 N.E.2d at 374. See Saltonstall v. New York Cent. 
R.R., 237 Mass. 391, 397-98, 130 N.E. 185, 188-89 (1921) (the Legislature may not 
legalize a nuisance that would amount to a taking of private property and provide im-
munity from liability to the party establishing the nuisance). See also Griggs v. Allegheny 
County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (frequent low-level flights may constitute a "taking" under 
the fifth amendment); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (same). 
14 For example, a nuisance action would avoid the procedural and evidentiary restric-
tions placed on eminent domain actions by G.L. c. 79, §§ 22 & 35. Section 22 requires 
that an eminent domain action be heard in the first instance by a judge sitting without a 
jury. Section 35 bars the use of tax assessments as evidence of real estate's value unless 
there has been a comprehensive revaluation of the town's real estate within the five 
5
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plaintiff to bear the loss of his business to satisfy th~ needs of the fIy-
ing public, however, suggests the need for legislatiqn shifting the loss 
to that segment of the public that obtains the direct benefits from the 
airport's presence. 
§5.4. Interference with Contractual Relations: Measure of 
Damages. Traditionally, damages recoverable for I interference with 
contractual relations are tort in character-the los~ of advantage to 
plaintiff resulting from the interference. 1 On the other hand, an un-
just enrichment measure of damages-the benefit to defendant from 
his wrongful conduct-has long been recognized for such business 
torts as unfair competition and trade name, tradem4rk, and copyright 
infringement. 2 In the Survey year decision of Natitmal Merchandising 
Corp. v. Leyden,3 the Supreme Judicial Court approyed the unjust en-
richment measure of damages as appropriate for an action for inter-
ference with contractual relations.4 
In National Merchandising, the defendant, plaintiff's business com-
petitor in the advertising business, knowingly en(tployed plaintiff's 
former employees to solicit advertising in the New England area in 
violation of an i~unction prohibiting the employeesifrom then engag-
ing in such activity.5 The injunction had issued earlier because the 
employees, after leaving plaintiff's employ, were violating a noncom-
petition agreement with plaintiff. The superior cOl(1rt awarded dam-
ages to the plaintiff calculated on the basis of ten percent of 
defendant's tainted gross income.6 One of defendapt's arguments on 
years preceeding the three years preceding the taking. For a discussion of § 35, see 
Stewart v. Town of Burlington, 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2153, 319 N.E.2d 921, 
discussed in Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1975 ANN. SURV. NiASS. LAW § 19.19, at 
553-55. For other limitations in eminent domain law, see generall~ G.L. c. 79. 
§5.4. 1 Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 565 (1871). While the damages must be 
reasonably capable of ascertainment and will not be assumed, Sharratt v. Housing In-
novations, Inc., 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 575, 582, 310 N.E.2d 343, 348, discussetLin Student 
Comment, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 6.11, at 125-35, an eIe~ent of uncertainty in 
their assessment is not a bar to recovery, H.D. Watts Co. v. Amerkan Bond & Mortgage 
Co., 267 Mass. 541, 553-54, 166 N.E. 713, 717 (1929). Where tile difficulties in deter-
mining damages arise in large part from defendant's conduct, a' reasonable approxilna-
tion will suffice. Air Technology Corp. v. General Electric Co., 347 Mass. 613, 627, 199 
N.E.2d 538, 548 (1964). 
2 Forster Mfg. Co. v. Cutter-Tower Co., 211 Mass. 219, 223, 97 N.E. 749, 750 (1912). 
See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 136 (1937). The Restatemellt took no position on 
whether an unjust enrichment measure of damages should be applicable to cases of in-
terference with contractual relations, see REsTATEMENT OF REsTlitfTlON § 133, comment 
c, caveat (1937). : 
3 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1472,348 N.E.2d 77'1. 
f [d. at 1480-82, 348 N.E.2d at 775-76. 
• /d. at 1474-75,348 N.E.2d at 773. 
e Id. at 1475, 1479, 348 N.E.2d at 773, 775. The 10% factor ~as deemed to be the 
equivalent of the defendant's approximate margin of profit from is tainted income. /d. 
at 1479, 348 N.E.2d at 775. The defendant's tainted income was d fined as its New Eng-
6
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appeal was that the damages were excessive because they were based 
on the defendant's increased profits, which was an UI~uSt enrichment 
measure of damages, rather than on the plaintiffs lost profits, which 
was a tort measure of damages. 7 
Initially the Court in National Merchandising examined the damages, 
viewed as tort in character, and held that there was nothing un-
reasonable in the trial judge's taking the defendant's profit as the 
amount that plaintiff would have been capable of generating had de-
fendant not tortiously interfered.s In light of the rule that a reasona-
ble approximation of damages suffices where defendant's conduct 
creates the difficulty in proving damages, 9 the trial judge's premise 
appears a proper one. However, rather than simply approving the 
premise used by the trial court in assessing tort damages-that 
defendant's profit approximated plaintiffs loss-the Court in National 
Merchandising went on to uphold the damages on an independent 
ground: that defendant must pay plaintiff the amount the defendant 
gained by its wrongful conduct even if it exceeded the amount of 
plaintiffs loss.10 Otherwise, the Court reasoned, an intending tort-
feasor might "be prompted to speculate that his profits might exceed 
the injured party's losses, thus encouraging commission of the tort."l1 
While there are not numerous cases in point, the unjust enrichment 
measure of damages has been applied in other jurisdictions in inter-
ference with contract cases. 12 It has also been applied, albeit rarely, in 
cases involving trespass to chattels13 and trespass to land.14 It has been 
unsuccessfully argued in defamation actions15 and invasion of privacy 
actions where the claimed right was of a purely personal nature. 16 
Some progress has been made for such a measure of damages in 
land advertising sales during the period it was employing plaintiffs former employees 
in violation of the injunction. Id., 348 N.E.2d at 775. 
7Id. at 1476, 1477-80,348 N.E.2d at 773, 774-75. 
8Id. at 1479,348 N.E.2d at 774-75. 
9 See note I supra. 
10See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1480-82, 348 N.E.2d at 775-76. 
11 Id. at 1482, 348 N.E.2d at 776. This reason is similar to the justification advanced 
for benefit-of-the-bargain damages in deceit actions. See Rice v. Price, 340 Mass. 502, 
506-11, 164 N.E.2d 891, 894-97 (1960); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 
1l0, at 731-36 (4th ed. 1971). 
12 Second Nat'l Bank v. M. Samuel & Sons, Inc., 12 F.2d 963, 968 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. 
denied, 273 U.S. 720 (1926); Federal Sugar Ref. Co. v. United States Sl!gar Equalization 
Bd., Inc., 268 F. 575, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1920); Schechter v. Friedman, 141 N.J. Eq. 318, 
325, 57 A.2d 251, 255 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948); Caskie v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit 
Co., 321 Pa. 157, 163, 184 A. 17,20 (1936). 
130lwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 285-87, 173 P.2d 652,653-54 (1946) . 
.. Edwards v. Lee's Administrator, 265 Ky. 418, 423-28, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1030-32 
(1936). 
15 Hart v. E. P. Dutton & Co., 197 Misc. 274, 93 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1949), affd, 277 App. 
Div. 935, 98 N.Y.S.2d 773, reargument and appeal denied, 277 App. Div. 962,99 N.Y.S.2d 
1014 (1950). 
16 Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198,220-21,20 So. 2d 243, 254 (1944). 
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those actions for invasion of privacy that involve t~e appropriation of 
some element of plaintiffs personality for comme~cial purposes,17 no 
doubt as a result of the close similarity between that category of inva-
sion of privacy and the torts involving unfair competition.18 
§S.S. No-Fault: Persons Entitled to Workmen's Compensation. 
The Massachusetts "no-fault" statute allows an itijured party to re-
cover against the insurer for his medical expenses 4nd for seventy-five 
percent of his lost wages, calculated on the basis of! his average weekly 
wage. 1 Total recovery cannot exceed $2,000. After listing the persons 
entitled to recovery, the statute reads: "unless any of the aforesaid is a 
person entitled to payments or benefits under the provisions of chap-
ter one hundred and fifty-two .... "2 Chapter 1~2 of the General 
Laws3 is the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensati<l>n Act. 
In the Survey year decision of Flaherty v. The TraJelers Insurance CO.,3 
plaintiff was injured while operating a truck within and during the 
course of his employment and was therefore entitled to workmen's 
compensation benefits.4 Plaintiffs average weekly ,.age was $220. He 
was out of work for eight and one-half weeks, recetving $95 per week 
under workmen's compensation.5 Under "no-faultr' insurance, plain-
tiff would have received approximately $165 per week.6 Plaintiff 
brought an action against defendant, the insurer of the truck, to re-
cover "no-fault" benefits. He was denied recovery in the district court 
on the basis that the "no-fault" statute expressly excludes persons enti-
tled to benefits under workmen's compensation. 7 T~is decision was af-
firmed by both the Appellate Division of the DistrIct Courts8 and ul-
timately by the Supreme Judicial Court.9 
Plaintiffs principal argument for his position-that despite the ex-
clusionary language in the "no-fault" statute, he WClis nevertheless enti-
tled to "no-fault" benefits-was that such language, was designed only 
to prevent double recovery of medical expenses a~d not to limit the 
injured party's right to reimbursement of wages in an amount equal 
17 For a good discussion of this area, see generally York, Extension of RestiJ:utimud Rem-
edies in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A, L. REV. 499 (1957). 
18 G.L. c. 214, § 3A, provides for i~unctive relief and damages for this category of 
invasion of privacy. The damage provision permits recovery ''for any injuries sustained by 
reason of such usc" (emphasis added). This would appear to be a tort measure of dam-
ages, perhaps precluding a court from adopting an unjust enrichment approach. 
§5.5. 1 G.L. c. 90, § 34A ("Personal injury protection"). 
2ld. 
31976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 100,340 N.E.2d 888. 
'Id. at lOll, 340 N.E.2d at 889-90. 
"ld., 340 N.E.2d at 890. 
6 $165 is 75% of the plaintiffs average weekly wage of $220. 
7 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 101-02, 340 N.E.2d at 890. 
81d. at 102, 340 N.E.2d at 890. 
91d. 
8
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to up to seventy-five percent of his weekly wage. 10 He buttressed this 
claim with the argument that inequities could result if an injured 
workman was deprived of the three-fourths of his wages under "no-
fault," and thereby had to accept the markedly lesser amount pro-
vided by workmen's compensation. ll 
In rejecting plaintiffs argument, the Court, in addition to relying 
on the "unambiguous" language of the statute,12 also pointed out that 
other differences exist between "no-fault" insurance and workmen's 
compensation. For example, under workmen's compensation, the 
Court observed, had plaintiffs injury been caused by the negligence 
of a third party, plaintiff could have recovered his entire lost wages in 
an action against the third party.l3 Under "no-fault," however, the 
negligent third party would have been exempt from liability up to 
$2,000. 14 Under neither plan could recovery be had for pain and suf-
fering, unless the provisions of section 6D of chapter 231 of the Gen-
eral Laws15 applied.16 
The Court's decision in Flaherty is obviously correct in Light of the 
language of section 34A of chapter 90 of the General LawsY The 
question remains, however, whether the Flaherty result should be al-
tered by an amendment to section 34A. Such an amendment would 
be called for if the Flaherty situation, namely, the inability of an in-
jured party covered by workmen's compensation to recover lost wages 
under "no-fault," results from either legislative oversight or unsound 
policy. 
10 [d. at 104, 340 N.E.2d at 891. 
IIld. at 105, 340 N.E.2d at 891. The plaintiff cited the case of two workers, one cov-
ered by workmen's compensation and the other not. Assuming both workers were in-
jured in an automobile accident, the workmen's compensation covered worker would 
recover "a markedly lesser amount." [d. 
12ld. at 104-05,340 N.E.2d at 891. 
13 [d. at 106, 340 N.E.2d at 892. The plaintiff would be required to reimburse the 
workmen's compensation insurer for payments received from the third party. C.L. c. 
152, § 15. 
14 C.L. c. 90, §§ 34A ("Personal injury protection") & 34M. 
15 C.L. c. 231, § 6D provides in part: 
In any action of tort brought as a result of bodily injury, sickness or disease, aris-
ing out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle within 
this commonwealth by the defendant, a plaintiff may recover damages for pain 
and suffering, including mental suffering associated with such injury, sickness or 
disease, only if the reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in treating such in-
jury, sickness or disease ... are determined to be in excess of five hundred dol-
lars unless such injury, sickness or disease (1) causes death, or (2) consists ... of 
loss ot a body member, or (3) consists ... ot permanent and seriOUS dlsligurement, 
or (4) results in such loss of sight or hearing as is described in [C.L. c. 152, § 
36(a)-(g)] ... or (5) consists of a fracture. 
For a discussion of the applicability of C.L. c. 231, § 6D, see § 5.6 infra, examining 
Scandura. v. Trombly Motor Coach Serv., Inc., 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1752,351 N.E.2d 
202. 
16 See Flaherty, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 106,340 N.E.2d at 892. 
17 For the relevant language of § 34A, see text at note 2 supra. 
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It is highly unlikely that the Legislature was unaware of the large 
difference in the amount recoverable per week for lost wages under 
"no-fault" and workmen's compensation. Further, it is submitted that 
the legislative decision to exclude recipients of workmen's compensa-
tion from the "no-fault" plan was sound. Both workmen's compensa-
tion and "no-fault" attempt to provide compensatfon to an injured, 
party without proof of fault and regardless of th4 injured person's 
fault. Each operates within a certain enterprise. Pr¢miums under the 
plan are set on the basis of experience (i.e., benefit~ paid out in prior 
years). When a person, such as the plaintiff in Flah1rty, happens to be 
involved in both enterprises, there is no reason why legislative policy 
should allow him to select the plan that awards him th'e larger ben-
efits, or one supplemented by the other. Suppose, for example, that 
the plaintiff in Flaherty had been unable to work for an entire year. 
Certainly he would not be satisfied with the $2,000 maximum amount 
awarded under "no-fault." Further, there is no rerson why a work-
man receiving an injury while operating a truck Shf,Uld receive more 
compensation than one'who is injured, for example while working in 
a factory. Therefore, the Flaherty result would not s em to suggest the 
need for any amendment to the "no-fault" statute. i 
§5.6. No-Fault: Common Carriers. Section 6D iof chapter 231 of 
the General Laws provides that there can be no recovery for pain 
and suffering, including mental suffering, resulting from an au-
tomobile accident unless the medical expenses exceed $500 or the in-
jury causes either death, loss of a body member, permanent and seri-
ous disfigurement, loss of sight or hearing, or consists of a fracture. 
The purpose of section 6D is to preclude a circumvention of one of 
the primary goals of the "no-fault" statute, namelyL the avoidance of 
personal injury claims having only nuisance value. 1 ror the third time 
in as many years,2 a question of the application of section 6D was pre-
sented to the Supreme Judicial Court.3 . 
The plaintiff in Scandura v. Trombly Motor Coach S~rvice, Inc. 4 was in-
jured while a passenger aboard a bus whose common carrier owner 
was covered by "no-fault" insurance.s The plaintiff herself had no 
personal injury protection benefits ("no-fault") available to her 
§5.6. 1 Limiting damages for pain and suffering avoids nuisance suits because poten-
tial plaintiffs cannot use such damages to bring their claims above $2,000, which is the 
limit of a defendant's exemption under G.L. c. 90, § 34M. See Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 
Mass. I, 28-29, 271 N.E.2d 592, 609-10 (1971), discussed in I Wadsworth & Ryan, 
Insurance Law, 1971 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 11.18, at 244-47. i 
2 See Cyr v. Farias, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1508, 327 N.E.2d ~90, discussed in Smith, 
Torts, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 1.6, at 13-15; Chipman iv. Massachusetts Bay 
Transp. Auth., 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1447, 316 N.E.2d 725, ditcussed in Smith, Torts, 
1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 6.9, at 119-21. 
3 Scandura v. Trombly Motor Coach Serv., Inc., 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1752, 351 
N.E.2d 202. 
4Id. 
5Id. at 1752, 351 N .E.2d at 203. 
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through a vehicle owned by her or by a member of her household. 6 
Plaintiff advanced two arguments for the non application of section 
6D, both based upon the fact that defendant was a common carrier. 
First, the plaintiff pointed out that in the 1974 decision, Chipman v. 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority,7 the Supreme Judicial Court 
had allowed a plaintiff who was injured while boarding a bus to re-
cover in negligence against the defendant-common carrier without the 
application of section 6D.8 Second, the plaintiff argued that since she 
was suing the defendant-common carrier on a contract theory, section 
6D should have no application. 9 The Supreme Judicial Court rejected 
both arguments. 10 
With respect to the argument based upon Chipman, the Court in 
Scandura pointed out that Chipman was decided on the basis that 
neither plaintiff nor defendant had any connection with the "no-fault" 
insurance system.H Thus in Scandura, where the defendant was cov-
ered by "no-fault" insurance, the fact that the defendant was a com-
mon carrier did not render section 6D inapplicable. 12 In rejecting the 
plaintiffs second argument, the Court pointed out that there ap-
peared to be no showing that the Legislature intended that passengers 
in vehicles for hire should be treated any differently from those in 
private vehicles. 13 On the contrary, the Court reasoned that to allow a 
circumvention of section 6D in actions against carriers for hire on the 
theory that plaintiffs action sounds in contract would frustrate in part 
the purpose of the "no-fault" statute. 14 
Scandura's message is clear: section 6D of chapter 231 of the Gen-
eral Laws will apply in all cases except where neither plaintiff nor de-
fendant has any connection with "no-fault." The status of plaintiff or 
defendant makes no difference. IS Additionally, the fact that plaintiff 
did not in fact benefit from "no-fault" is not a relevant 
consideration.16 
6Id. at 1753, 351 N.E.2d at 203. The plaintiff, however, as an "authorized ... pas-
senger" of the defendant was entided to recover for her medical expenses from the 
defendant's insurer. See G.L. c. 90, § 34A. The plaintiffs medical expenses were $128. 
1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1754, 351 N.E.2d at 204. 
7 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1447,316 N.E.2d 725. 
8See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1754 n.4, 1758-59,351 N.E.2d at 204 n.4, 205. 
"See id. at 1754 n.4, 1760-62,351 N.E.2d at 204 n.4, 206-07. The plaintiffs argu-
ment appears to have been based on § 6D's first line which states that § 6U is applicable 
"[iln any action of tort . ... " G.L. c. 231, § 6D (emphasis added). 
10 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1757,1760-61,351 N.E.2d at 205, 206. 
11 See id. at 1758-59,351 N.E.2d at 205. 
12Id. at 1759, 351 N.E.2d at 205. 
13Id. at 1762,351 N.E.2d at 206. 
14 /d. at 1761-62,351 N.E.2d at 206-07. 
15 Compare Chipman v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1447, 
316 N.E.2d 725 (§ 6D not applied where defendant was a common carrier) with 
Scandura v. Trombly Motor Coach Serv., Inc., 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1752, 351 N.E.2d 
202 (§ 6D applied where defendant was a common carrier). 
I. See Cyr v. Farias, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1508,327 N.E.2d 890 (§ 6D applied even 
though out of state plaintiffs were not entided to any "no-fault" benefits). 
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§5.7 .. Guest in Motor Vehicle: Duty Owed. In !1971, the Mas-
sachusetts Legislature enacted section 85L of chapter 231 of the Gen-
eral Laws,1 which section increased the duty of th~ operator of a 
motor vehicle to his guest from merely the avoiaance of gross 
negligence2 to the exercise of ordinary care. 3 The 1 971 legislation 
took effect on January 1, 1972 and was to apply only! to causes of ac-
tion arising after that date.4 Mounsey v. Ellard,s decided in 1973, held 
that the owner or occupier of land owed a duty of ordinary care to all 
lawful visitors on the property irrespective of whether they were busi-
ness invitees, social guests, or licensees. II During the! Survey year, in 
Paduano v. Tifft, 7 the Supreme Judicial Court was called upon to de-
cide whether the Mounsey principle applied to motor vfhicle guests for 
accidents occurring before January 1, 1972, the effective date of sec-
tion 85L of chapter 231 of the General Laws.8 The C(>urt held that it 
did not.9 . 
In Paduano, the plaintiff-appellant argued that the Mounsey princi-
ple "should extend also to efface the distinction between guest pas-
sengers and passengers for hire in actions to enforce an operator's 
duty of care; and should, moreover, be given retroactive effect .... "10 
§5.7. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 865, § I. 
2 In the 1917 decision, Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 1I8 N,.E. 168 (1917), the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the guest in a motor vehicle was n~t entitled to a duty 
of ordinary care. The basis for this rule was that one who renders services gratuitously 
should not be under the same duty of care to the recipient as on~ who renders such 
services for payor other benefits. /d. at 510, 188 N.E. at 177. Subsequent cases estab-
lished the rule that the duty owed to a guest, defined as one whose presence in the 
motor vehicle confers no benefit upon the operator other than a s~ial benefit, Taylor 
v. Goldstein, 329 Mass. 161, 165, 107 N.E.2d 14, 16 (1952), was to avoid gross negli-
gence. E.g., Wheatley v. Peirce, 354 Mass. 573, 576, 238 N.E.2d 861,.868 (1968). 
3 G.L. c. 231, § 85L, states: 
In an action of tort for personal injuries, property damage or consequential 
damages caused by or arising from the operation of a motor vehicle in which the 
plaintiff was a passenger in the exercise of due care, the plaintiff may recover in 
an action against the operator upon proof that said operator was guilty of ordinary 
negligence resulting in said injuries or damages. . 
4 Acts of 1971, c. 865, § 2. 
• 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973). For a complete discussion of Mounsey, see 
Student Comment, 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 11.17, at 325-49. 
8363 Mass. at 707, 297 N.E.2d at 51. 
1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1744,351 N.E.2d 210. 
8 Acts of 1971, c. 865, § 2. 
91976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1745, 351 N.E.2d at 211. Two months before deciding 
Paduano, the Supreme Judicial Court in Kolrifsky v. Heath, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1I79, 
346 N.E.2d 863, affirmed the trial judge's grant of a directed verdi¢t motion in a case 
involving a pre-1972 accident, on the ground that the evidence failed to warrant a find-
ing of gross negligence. [d. at 1179, 346 N.E.2d at 863. In Kolofskyj the Court stated: 
"The plaintiff does not ask us to reexamine the rule (the avoidance Of gross negligence 
to a guest in the motor vehicle) in light of Mounsey . .. and we do nit." [d., 346N.E.2d 
at 863-64 (citation omitted). 
10 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1744, 351 N.E.2d at 211. Mounsey had been held retroactive 
as to lawful visitors on land in Bouchard v. DeGagne, 1975 Mass. t\.dv. Sh. 1856, 329 
N.E.2d 1I4, discussed in Smith, Torts 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § l.l~ at 3-5. 
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The Court, however, declined to discuss the issue of whether the 
Mounsey principle should apply to the field of motor vehicle torts, tak-
ing the position that the provision of section 2 of chapter 865 of the 
Acts of 1971, setting out the effective date of section 85L of chapter 
231 of the General Laws, "is to be read as assuming and confirming 
the existence of the traditional rule ... (the avoidance of gross negli-
gence) and changing it only as from January 1, 1972."11 This, the 
Court concluded, "excludes any possibility that might otherwise exist 
for bringing the Mounsey principle to bear on a case like the present 
where the accident antedated the January 1, 1972, deadline."12 
The statement by the Court in Paduano that the effective date lan-
guage for section 85L confirms the common law rule of gross negli-
gence for accidents antedating the statute's effective date seems unduly 
restrictive. It is doubtful that the Legislature intended to codify a 
common law rule for facts occurring prior to the effective date of a 
statute abolishing the common law ruleY Absent clear language in a 
statute to the contrary, the Court has the authority to change the 
common law and make it consistent with a statute for situations occur-
ring prior to the statute's effective date.14 Whether this ought to be 
done should be decided in each particular case on considerations simi-
lar to those involved when the issue is the retroactivity of a change in 
the common law. 15 In this context, consideration should be given to 
the degree of unfairness involved in the application of the old rule to 
the particular party weighed against the unfairness of applying the 
new rule to a party (or his insurer) who may have relied upon the old 
rule to shape his conduct (or, in the case of an insurer. in setting its 
insurance rates).16 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1745,351 N.E.2d at 211. 
11 /d. 
13 In fact there is Massachusetts precedent to the contrary. See Warner v. Whitman, 
353 Mass. 468, 472, 233 N.E.2d 14, 16-17 (1968) (Rule against Perpetuities); Selby v. 
Kuhns, 345 Mass. 600, 607, 188 N.E.2d 861, 865-66 (1963) (effect of release of one 
joint tortfeasor on the other). 
14 See cases cited in note 13 supra. 
15See Bouchard v. DeGagne, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1856,329 N.E.2d 114, giving re-
troactive effect to the Mounsey principle to lawful visitors on land. In Sorensen v. Soren-
sen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3662, 339 N.E.2d 907, the Supreme Judicial Court, after 
holding that a child could maintain an action against his parent for injury arising out of 
the negligent operation of a motor vehide, declined to decide the issue of retroactivity, 
preferring to leave consideration of that question to a future case where the issue may 
be fully argued by the parties.ld. at 3685-86, 339 N.E.2d at 917. In Pevoski v. Pevoski, 
1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2624, 2628, 358 N.E.2d 416, 418, the Court retroactively applied 
the holding of Lewis v. Lewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1764, 351 N.E.2d 526, which 
abolished interspousal immunity in Massachusetts. For a discussion of Sorensen and 
Lewis, see §5.10 infra. 
18See Smith, Torts, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 1.1, at 305, discwsing Bouchard v. 
DeGagne, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1856, 329 N.E2d 114 (rule establishing duty of reasona-
ble care toward all lawful visitors on land applied retroactively) and § lA, discussing 
Higgins v. Emerson Hosp., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1499, 328 N.E.2d 488 (statute abolish-
ing charitable immunity not applied retroactively). 
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Paduano will not affect the result of many futur~ cases involving 
guests in automobiles because the statute will now qover most situa-
tions. However, the issue left open in Paduano, whether the Mounsey 
principle applies in other relationships, is still critical. I What effect, for 
example, does the Mounsey principle have on the duty, of a landlord to 
his tenant?17 
§5.8. Negligence: Proximate Cause. In H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 1 defendant, Ford Motor Co., negli~ently manufac-
tured a truck,2 resulting in injury to the plaintiff-operator, an em-
ployee of H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.3 In the plaintiff-operator's action 
against Ford,4 Ford moved for a directed verdict on !the ground that 
Ford, after discovering a steering defect with the particular model of 
truck, notified Hood of the truck's likely defective cpndition and of-
fered free of charge to remedy the defect,S and that Hood negligently 
failed to take advantage of this opportunity.6 The trial judge denied 
Ford's motion and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff-
17 See §5.9 infra for discussion of this issue. After the close of !the Survey year, the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Lindsey v. Massios, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 381, 360 N.E.2d 
631, held that a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care to his ten ",nt's guests in main-
taining the property which the landlord controls. The Court overruled prior cases hold-
ing that a landlord owes to his tenant's visitors the same duty helowes to his tenants 
concerning the maintenance of property under his control. . 
§5.8. 1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 909, 345 N.E.2d 683. 
2 Ford's negligence concerned the faulty installation of a "right front spring hanger 
bracket." Defective rivets allowed the bracket to separate from the Itruck's frame which 
caused the truck to turn over onto its side. See id. at 912-13, 345 N.E.2d at 686. On ap-
peal, Ford did not dispute the jury's finding that Ford was negligept in manufacturing 
the truck.ld. at 913-14, 345 N.E.2d at 687. 
31d. at 909,345 N.E.2d at 685. i 
4 Hood also brought suit against Ford for damages to the truck, 'its contents, and re-
frigerating equipment installed in it.ld. at 910, 345 N.E.2d at 685. ,The jury found for 
Ford in this action, apparently based on Hood's own negligence.!d: at 918, 345 N.E.2d 
at 688. • , 
Ford brought a third party action against Hood in contract for iindemnification for 
any damages recoverable by the plaintiff-operator. ld. at 910, 345 N.E.2d at 685. Ford 
claimed that it and Hood had contracted to have Hood accomplish the repairs and, im-
pliedly, to hold Ford harmless for its negligence. !d. at 918, 345 N.E.2d at 688. The 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial judge's grant of Hood's ljIirected verdict mo-
tion on the ground that Ford failed to establish the existence of a' contract between it 
and Hood. !d. at 918-21, 345 N.E.2d at 688-90. 
S The notification was in compliance with the National Traffic iand Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1970). The relevant portions of the notify-
ing letter are set out in Hood, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 915 nA, 345 N!.E.2d at 687 nA. 
6 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 914, 918, 345 N.E.2d at 687, 688. Ford's directed verdict 
motion was also based on the argument that good faith complianc~ with the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1970), provided 
it with a valid defense as a matter of law. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 914, 345 N.E.2d at 
687. The Court disposed of this claim by citing 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) ~1970), which states: 
"Compliance with any Federal 'motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchap-
ter does not exempt any person from liability under common law."ISee Larsen v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968). 
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operator in the sum of $21,500.7 Affirming the trial judge's refusal 
to grant Ford's directed verdict motion, the Supreme Judicial Court 
held that Hood's negligent8 handling of the matter after receiving 
Ford's notice did not, under the circumstances of the case, relieve 
Ford of liability to the plaintiff-operator as a matter of law. 9 
Massachusetts requires a manufacturer or seller of an unsafe or de-
fective product, upon discovering the danger in the product's use, to 
warn the purchasers of the product.10 Failure to warn may constitute 
a basis for liability.ll The Hood case deals with the extent to which a 
timely warning provided by a manufacturer to a purchaser-employer 
avoids liability when an employee of the purchaser-employer is 
harmed despite the warning. The issue is one of superseding cause 
and foreseeability.12 A purchaser-employer's failure to have a defec-
tive product repaired after having received notice of a defect may be 
so outrageous as to constitute as a matter of law, the sole legal cause of 
an employee's injury.13 More often, however, it is a jury question 
whether the manufacturer might reasonably anticipate that the em-
ployer will fail to have the defect remedied prior to use by its 
employees.14 
Prime considerations in determining whether to submit the case to 
the jury are the character and position of the employer who has been 
warned, his relationship to the defendant or to the plaintiff, and the 
likelihood that the employer will or will not exercise proper care.15 
Other considerations, however, do exist. Where, for example, the 
manufacturer's notice sets a charge for improving the product's 
safety, it is more likely that the employer will refuse or delay accept-
ance of the offer than where the service is offered free of charge. 
Consequently, that fact usually warrants submitting to the jury the 
question of whether the manufacturer should have reasonably 
7 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 911,345 N.E.2d at 686. 
S The Court stated that Hood's negligence could be implied from the jury's finding 
against Hood in its action against Ford. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 918,345 N.E.2d at 688. 
See note 4 supra. 
91976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 918,345 N.E.2d at 688. 
10 See, e.g., Haley v. Allied Chemical Corp., 353 Mass. 325, 330, 231 N.E.2d 549, 553 
(1967). 
11 See doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1591, 1599,328 N.E.2d 873, 877 
(1975), discussed in Smith, Torts, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 1.2, at 5-8. 
12 Fredericks v. American Exports Lines, Inc., 227 F.2d 450, 453-54 (2d Cir. 1955). 
13 See, e.g., Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal. 2d 688, 693-95, 59 P.2d 100, 103 
(1936) (manufacturer of defective plank not liable for injuries sustained by employee in 
collapse of scaffold where employer built scaffold with knowledge of defect); if. Ford 
Motor v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946) (manufacturer of car not li-
able for injuries sustained by driver where previous owner refused to have defective 
hood latch replaced). 
USee Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 645-49, 105 Cal. Rptr. 
890,898-901 (1972). 
15 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 452(2), comment f (1965). 
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foreseen that the employer would not have the defect 'remedied prior 
to use. 16 
By affirming the denial of Ford's directed verdict mption, the court 
in Hood determined that a jury could find that Ford should have an-
ticipated Hood's negligent delay in remedying the defective trucks. It 
is unclear from the Hood opinion, however, exactly what circumstance 
appearing in the evidence warranted such a findin~. The letter to 
Hood made it clear that no charge was involved. 17 There is some dis-
cussion in the opinion concerning negotiations between Ford and 
Hood relative to the repairs being done by Hood's ,mechanics with 
Ford supplying the repair kits and reimbursing Hoo~ for the labor, 
and that the repair kits supplied by Ford were inqomplete. 18 The 
opinion does not indicate, however, whether Hood informed Ford 
concerning the incompleteness of the repair kits or what interval of 
time elapsed between the receipt of the incomplettj repair kits by 
Hood and the date of the accident. Over two months elapsed between 
the notification of the defect by Ford and the accident.19 If Ford had 
been informed of the incompleteness of the repair kits and had not 
supplied the deficiency by the date of the accident, or i had just shortly 
before the accident supplied the deficiency, a jury could find Ford 
negligent. On the other hand, if Hood failed to inform Ford of the 
deficiency or if Ford had supplied the deficiency long prior to the ac-
cident, and thus assumed that the trucks were being repaired, the 
finding of Ford's negligence seems unsupported. 
§5.9. Negligence: Landlord and Tenant. In the Survey year deci-
sion of Perry v. Medeiros,! the Supreme Judicial Court held: first, that 
a landlord's violation of a safety ordinance can serve as evidence of 
the landlord's common law negligence in the maintenance of common 
areas;2 and second, that section 19 of chapter 84 of tqe General Laws, 
which extends the "snow and ice" statute's3 thirty-day notice period4 
16 See Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 648-49, 105 Cal. Rptr. 
890,901 (1972). 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 915 n.4, 345 N.E.2d at 687 n.4. 
18 [d. at 917-18, 345 N.E.2d at 688. 
19 The notification was sent on March 27, 1968, and the accident occurred on June 7, 
1968. /d. at 912, 915 n.4, 345 N.E.2d at 686, 687 n.4. 
§5 .9. 11976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 621, 343 N.E.2d 859. 
2 [d. at 626-27, 343 N.E.2d at 862. 
3 C.L. c. 84, §§ 17-21. In general, the "snow and ice" statute bar~ a person from re-
covering damages caused by snow or ice unless the person oblig~lted by law to clear 
away the snow and ice is notified of the accident within thirty days! [d. The purpose of 
the .statute is to give the potential defendant a reasonable chance to collect evidence be-
fore the snow or ice melts. See Urban v. Simes, 259 Mass. 336, 337-38, 156 N.E. 697, 
698 (1927). I 
• C.L. c. 84, § 18, provides in part: ! 
A person [injured by reason of snow or ice] ... shall, within thirty days thereafter, 
give to the ... person by law obliged to keep said way in repair, notice of the 
name and place of residence of the person injured, and the tim<j, place and cause 
of said injury or damage . . . . ' 
16
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in cases of physical or mental incapacity,S applies only where the 
plaintiffs incapacity results from the "loss of the faculties of the mind, 
or from a lack of power to use the mind because of the loss or im-
pairment of the organs of the body."6 
In Perry, plaintiff-tenant sustained injuries when she fell down a 
common stairway outside defendants' apartment house. 7 Plaintiff al-
leged that the stairs were negligently maintained, having an accumula-
tion of snow and ice.s Further, plaintiff claimed that she lost her foot-
ing when the storm door slammed shut against her as she stepped out 
on the top step.9 The storm door, which was closed by an attached 
spring arrangement, had been installed after the commencement of 
plaintiffs tenancy.l0 Plaintiff attempted to introduce in evidence sec-
tion 6.08 of the Taunton Building Code, which provided that "[n]o 
exit door shall open immediately on a flight of stairs [without] . . . a 
landing ... [being] provided .... "11 Although defendants' stairway 
did not have such a landing, the trial judge excluded the evidence of 
the building code.12 
Plaintiff, who was hospitalized for approximately thirty days follow-
ing the accident, notified the defendants of the accident fifty-two days 
following the accident,13 rather than within thirty days as required by 
section 18 of chapter 84.14 At the trial and on appeal, plaintiff 
claimed that she was physically incapacitated within the meaning of 
section 19 of chapter 841S and, therefore, that her notice was timely.16 
The trial judge rejected the applicability of section 19 and instructed 
the jury that if they found that plaintiffs injuries were "caused by, or 
contributed to, in whole or in part, by an accumulation of snow and 
• [d. § 19, provides in part: "If by reason of physical or mental incapacity it is impos-
sible for the person injured to give the notice within the time required, he may give it 
within thirty days after such incapacity has been removed .... " 
6 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 630-31,343 N.E.2d at 863-64. See text at notes 25-29 infra. 
7 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 622, 343 N.E.2d at 861. 
8 [d. 
B [d. at 624, 343 N.E.2d at 861. 
10/d. 
11 TAUNTON. MA .. BUILDING CODE § 6.08, quoted in Perry, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
625-26, 343 N.E.2d at 862. 
12 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 626,343 N.E.2d at 862. 
13 See id. at 623, 343 N.E.2d at 861. 
14 For the text of § 18, see note 4 supra. By Acts of 1973, c. 1085, the following sen-
tence was added to G.L. c. 84, § 18: "Failure to give such notice for such injury or 
damage sustained by reason of snow or ice shall not be a defense under this section un-
less defendant proves that he was prejudiced thereby." This amendment did not apply 
to the present case where the injury occurred on December 31, 1967. 1976 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 629 n.5, 343 N.E.2d at 863 n.5. 
IS For the text of § 19, see note 5 supra. Plaintiff claimed that she suffered a frac-
tured sacrum in the fall and as a result was strapped to a fracture board while in the 
hospital. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. -,t 631 n.6, 343 N.E.2d at 864 n.6. 
16 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 629-30, 343 N.E.2d at 863. 
17
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ice, they must find for the defendants."17 The jury returned a verdict 
for the defendants. IS Plaintiff appealed. ' 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Perry held that the trial judge 
erred in excluding the building code from evidence, since a jury could 
find negligence from a violation of the code.19 In so holding, the 
Court has decided an issue explicitly left undecided ~n Dolan v. Suffolk· 
Franklin Savings Bank.20 In Dolan, the Court admitt~d evidence of a 
landlord's violation of an ordinance where a tenant alleged the land-
lord was negligent in allowing an unsafe condition ,n a noncommon 
area.21 The Court stated, however, that "we need not here reconsider 
the line of cases ... holding that violation of a statute or ordinance is 
not evidence of negligence ... where common areas are involved."22 
In Perry, the ordinance that was admitted in evideq.ce related to the 
condition of a common stairway.23 The Court's only reference in Perry 
to the older line of cases suggests that those cases will be either lim-
ited to their facts or overruled.24 
On the other hand, the Court held that the trial i judge ruled cor-
rectly that plaintiffs notice failed to satisfy the "snow! and ice" statute's 
thirty-day notice requirement. 25 The Court stated that the physical or 
mental incapacity which enlarges the notice period under section 1926 
means an inability of the plaintiff to give the notice due to 
a loss of the faculties of the mind, or from a lack of power to use 
the mind because of the loss or impairment of the organs of the 
body. Mere physical inability to move or be mov~d about or to 
write are not evidence of mental or physical incapa~ity.27 
17 [d. at 629, 343 N.E.2d at 863. 
18/d. at 621,343 N.E.2d at 860. 
19 [d. at 626-27, 343 N.E.2d at 862. 
20 355 Mass. 665, 246 N.E.2d 798 (1969), discussed in Donovan, Torts, 1969 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW § 1.11, at 22-23 and Schwartz, Property and Conveyancing, 1969 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW §§ 5.3-5.4, at 82-86. 
21 355 Mass. at 669, 246 N.E.2d at 800. 
22 [d. The line of cases holding that violation of a statute or ordinance is not evidence 
of a landlord's negligence in relation to common areas is: Stapleton v. Cohen, 353 Mass. 
53, 56, 228 N.E.2d 64, 66 (1967), ccrt. denied, 391 U.S. 968 (1968); Campbell v. 
Romanos, 346 Mass. 361, 368, 191 N.E.2d 764, 768 (1963); Richmond v. Warren In-
stitution for Savings, 307 Mass. 483, 485-86, 30 N.E.2d 407, 408-09 (1940). 
23 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 621, 343 N.E.2d at 860. See text at note '7 supra. 
24 In Perry, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 627, 343 N.E.2d at 863, the Court stated that "re-
liance on [the rule of Richmond v. Warren Institution for Savings, 307 Mass. 483, 30 
N.E.2d 407 (1940), see note 22 supra] is misplaced since the rule would have no applica-
tion to the facts of the case before us, assuming it would still be followed on facts simi-
lar to those in the Richmond case." After the close of the Survey year, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court in lindsey v. Massios, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 381, 360 N.E.i2d 631, admitted into 
evidence a landlord's violation of a safety statute in an action by la tenant's visitor for 
negligence in the maintenance of a common area. [d. at 385-86, 360 N.E.2d at 634. 
25 1976 Mass. Adv. So. at 630, 343 N.E.2d at 863. 
28 G.L. c. 84, § 19. For the text of § 19, see note 5 supra. ! 
27 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 630, 343 N.E.2d at 864, quoting G06dwin v. City of Fall 
River, 228 Mass. 529, 533, 117 N.E. 796, 797 (1917). Goodwin invblved the interpreta-
18
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Since the plaintiff in Perry had not lost the power to use her mind,28 
the Court found that section 19 was inapplicable and, therefore, that 
the plaintiff would be barred from recovering if her injuries resulted 
in whole or in part from snow and ice.29 Insofar as it was not possible 
to determine whether the jury had found that (a) the defendants were 
not negligent, or (b) that they were negligent, but that plaintiffs in-
jury resulted in whole or in part from snow or ice, the Court con-
cluded that plaintiff was entitled to a new trial. 30 
The hazardous condition in Perry was a result of the landlord's in-
stallation of the storm door after the commencement of the plaintiffs 
tenancy.31 Thus, apart from the snow and ice, the landlord's alleged 
negligence would have been a breach of his traditional duty to exer-
cise reasonable care to maintain common areas "in as good a condi-
tion as that in which thel were or appeared to be at the time of the 
creation of the tenancy." 2 The Court in Perry therefore had no occa-
sion to consider a pressing issue-namely, whether a landlord's duty 
to his tenant, which is the use of reasonable care to keep common 
areas in as good a condition as they were or appeared to be at the 
creation of the tenancy, 33 should be changed to the use of reasonable 
care to maintain such areas in a reasonably safe condition. It appears 
likely that in the very near future, the Supreme Judicial Court will 
impose upon landlords a general duty of reasonable care toward their 
tenants based on the reasoning of Mounsey v. Ellard. 34 In Mounsey, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the owner or occupier of land owed 
a duty of ordinary care to all lawful visitors on the property.35 In 
tion of a Rhode Island statute, which included substantially the same language now 
found in G.L. c. 84, § 19. Perry, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 630,343 N.E.2d at 863. 
28 See note 15 supra. 
29 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 632,343 N.E.2d at 864. 
30Id. The need for a new trial can be avoided in these situations by use of either the 
special verdict or the general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories. MASS. 
R. CIV. P. 49. See SMITH lie ZOBEL. MASSACHUSETTS RULES PRACTICE §§ 49.2, 49.3 (1977). 
While these devices should not be used routinely, see McCue v. The Prudential Ins. Co., 
1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2990, 2998-99, 358 N.E.2d 799, 803-04, where a jury may find for 
defendant (or for plaintiff) on more than one ground and one of the grounds is at least 
questionable, a special verdict or jury answers to interrogatories obviates the need for a 
new trial if the ground subsequently determined to be legally erroneous was not the 
sole basis for the appellee's victory. 
31 See text at note 10supra. 
32 Goodman v. Smith, 340 Mass. 336, 338, 164 N.E.2d 130, 131 (1960). Accord, e.g., 
Crea v. Stunzenas, 344 Mass. 265, 267,182 N.E.2d 141, 142 (1962). 
33 E.g., Crea v. Stunzenas, 344 Mass. 265, 267, 182 N.E.2d 141, 142 (1962); Goodman 
v. Smith, 340 Mass. 336, 338, 164 N.E.2d 130, 131 (1960). 
34 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973), discussed in Student Comment, 1973 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW § 11.17, at 325-49. 
3. 363 Mass. at 707, 297 N .E.2d at 51. After the close of the Survey year, the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Lindsey v. Massios, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 381, 360 N.E.2d 631, extended 
Mounsey so as to impose a duty of ordinary care on the part of a landlord to his tenant's 
guests.ld. at 384-85, N.E.2d at . Previously, the tenant's guest stood in the shoes of 
the tenant. See, e.g., Marsh v. Goldstein, 341 Mass. 83, 85, 167 N.E.2d 158, 160 (1960). 
19
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Sargent v. Ross,36 the Supreme Court of New Ham»shire, citing lan-
guage from the Mounsey opinion, held that the land~ord's duty to his 
tenants is the exercise of reasonable care.37 It is unlikely that the Su-
preme Judicial Court will hold in future cases that tenants are the only 
class of person lawfully on the property to whom the owner does not 
owe a common law duty of ordinary care. 
STUDENT COMMENT 
§5.10 The Abrogation of Parent-Child and Interspousal Im-
munity in Massachusetts. During the Survey year tt\.e Supreme Judi-
cial Court decided two cases involving immunity f~om tort liability. 
T?ese. cases, Sorensen v. Sorens~nl and L.ewis v. Lewis,~labolis?ed in cer-
tam CIrcumstances, parent-chIld and mterspousal Immumty respec-
tively. Sorensen arose out of an automobile collision between Paul 
Sorensen and Marlene Norton.3 Sorensen's two yelIr old daughter, 
Jessica, a passenger in his car, was seriously injured I in the accident.4 
Through her mother as next friend, Jessica brought! suit against both 
drivers for personal injuries, conscious suffering and medical 
expenses. 5 In her complaint against defendant Sorensen, the plaintiff 
.charged negligence and gross negligence6 resulting in injuries 
I 
In deciding Lindsey, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 384 n.2, 360 N.E.2d ~t 634 n.2, the Court 
was. careful to point out that "[ w le do not consider or decide today the extent of a 
landowner's duty to his tenants in this area .... " 
36 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). 
37 [d. at 398, 308 A.2d at 534. 
1 §5.10. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3662, 339 N.E.2d 907. 
21976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1764,351 N.E.2d 526. 
3 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3662, 339 N .E.2d at 908. 
4 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 2. 
• 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3662 & n.l, 339 N.E.2d at 908 & n.l. In deciding that an 
action could be maintained between parent and child on the fact~ of the Sorensen case, 
the Court did not discuss whether as a minor, Jessica could recover for her medical ex-
penses. See discussion in the notes and text at notes 220-26 infra. 
6 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3663,339 N.E.2d at 908. It was necessary for the plaintiff to 
plead gross negligence because at the time the injury arose, M:'!y 29, 1971, Agreed 
Statement for Plaintiff-Appellant at I, Massachusetts recognized the guest rule, a com-
mon law rule which prevented recovery by a guest passenger in an automobile absent a 
showing of gross negligence. See Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 4~7, 510, lI8 N.E. 168, 
177 (1917) (establishes guest rule in Massachusetts); brief for Defehdant-Appellee at II. 
In 197 I the Massach.usetts Legislature abrogated the guest rule pmspectively for causes 
of action arising after January I, 1972. G.L. c. 231, § 85L. This statute provides for re-
covery by a passenger in an automobile against the operator upon a showing of ordi-
nary negligence. In holding that there could be recovery against a parent for the neg-
ligent operation of an automobile, the Court in Sorensen did not mention the guest stat-
ute. See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3665, 339 N.E.2d at 909. While~he guest statute rep-
resents a potential barrier to recovery in the parent-child area, it i not insurmountable. 
For example, the Supreme Court of Virginia, when it overruled arent-child immunity 
for irUuries arising out of automobile accidents, avoided its guest statute by determining 
20
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amounting to $10,000. 7 The defendant received a judgment on the 
pleadings in the trial court,S and the Supreme Judicial Court on its 
own motion transferred the appeal directly from the Appeals Court. 9 
The plaintiff argued before the Supreme Judicial Court that since de-
fendant Sorensen was insured for the amount of damages sought, the 
real defendant in interest was his liability insurer,lo and therefore, any 
immunity based on family harmony should not bar her action. ll In 
addition, the plaintiff asked the Court to reexamine the principles 
underlying parent-child immunity, urging that contemporary condi-
tions no longer warranted immunity in automobile negligence 
actions. 12 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Judicial Court HELD: An 
action for negligence may be maintained by an unemancipated minor 
against a parent for injuries arising out of an automobile accident and 
recovery may be obtained to the extent of the parent's automobile lia-
bility insurance .13 In reaching its decision, the Court had to overcome 
the two policies supporting parent-child immunity previously adopted 
by the Court-that suits between family members would be a source 
that a child under fourteen years of age was incapable of having the volitional intent to 
become a guest. Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 187, 183 S.E.2d 190, 195 (1971). 
7 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 3. 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3663 & n.2, 339 N.E.2d at 908 & n.2. 
• Id. at 3663, 339 N.E.2d at 908. The Court transferred the appeal directly pursuant 
to G.L. c. 211A, § 10, which provides: 
Without regard to whether review is by appeal, bill of exceptions, report or other-
wise, appellate review of decisions made in the superior, land or probate courts, if 
within the jurisdiction of the appeals court, shall be in the first instance by the ap-
peals court except in the following cases in which appellate review shall be directly 
by the supreme judicial court without the necessity of any prior hearing or deci-
sion by the appeals court on the merits of the issues sought to be reviewed: 
(A) whenever two justices of the supreme judicial court issue an order for direct 
review by the supreme judicial court in any case on appeal, either at the request of 
one of the parties or at the court's own initiative, upon finding that the questions 
to be decided are: (1) questions of first impression or novel questions of law which 
should be submitted for final determination to the supreme judicial court; (2) 
questions of law concerning the Constitution of the commonwealth or questions 
concerning the Constitution of the United States which have been raised in a court 
of the commonwealth; (3) questions of such public interest that justice requires a 
final determination by the supreme judicial court. 
(B) Whenever the appeals court as a body or a m<tiority of the justices of the ap-
peals court considering a particular case certifies that direct review by the supreme 
judicial court is in the public interest. 
In each case where appellate review is not within the jurisdiction of the appeals 
court, appellate review shall be directly by the supreme judicial court, unless such 
case is transferred by the supreme judicial court to the appeals court for de-
termination in accordance with section twelve of this chapter. 
10 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 12. 
11 /d. 
12 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3664,339 N.E.2d at 908. 
13 /d. at 3665, 339 N.E.2d at 909. 
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of disharmony in the family unit14 and that suits between family 
members promote fraud and collusion. IS 
The Court rejected the disharmony rationale on four grounds. 16 
First, the Court reasone.d that the possibility of domestic strife arises 
from the injury itself and not from the institution oB the lawsuit to re-
cover damages for the injuryY On the contrary, o*ce an injury has 
occurred, the allowance of recovery when there is ipsurance to assist 
the i~ured party will help preserve the family unit! by easing family 
financial difficulties. IS Second, the Court recognized I that when an ac-
tion is brought by a child against a parent, it will \>e done with the 
parent's consent with a view toward recovery from the insurer. As a 
result, if there is no insurance, the chances of suit being brought are 
small. 19 Third, the Court noted that the common law has long permit-
ted actions between parent and child in the contract and property 
areas20 and reasoned that negligence actions would generate no more 
acrimony or disharmony than those actions which qave already been 
allowed. 21 If, as the Court previously stated, the family disruption 
arises from the adversary nature of the suit itself ratijer than from the 
particular conduct which led to the suit,22 the disru1l>tive effect would 
appear to be the same irrespective of whether the suit is a negligence 
or property action. Fourth, the Court noted that ~ny unsettling in-
fluence that litigation between a parent and child might have had has 
largely been dissipated by the widespread existence of liability in-
surance.23 The Court reasoned that child and parent in such an action 
would not truly be adversaries but would both be looking toward the 
insurance to provide the means for medical care and support for the 
child.24 This finding would appear to be an accepta~ce by the Court 
"See Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 481,13 N.E.2d 438, 439 ~1938). 
15 See id. at 483, 13 N.E.2d at 440. See also Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 299, 25 
N .E.2d 766, 767 (1940). . 
16 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3675,339 N.E.2d at 913. 
17Id. The case that created the parent-child immunity doctrine in the United States, 
Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), a case arising out of intentional con-
duct by the parent which justified the immunity solely on the basis of protecting the 
harmony of the home.Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887. 
18 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3679,339 N.E.2d at 914. 
IBId. at 3676-77,339 N.E.2d at 913. 
2°Id. at 3678, 339 N.E.2d at 914. While there are no Massachusetts cases specifically 
recognizing parent-child suits in contract or property actions, it appears that actions in-
volving property or contract rights have traditionally been alloweq, thus indicating. a ju-
dicial view that property or contract actions are less threatening tb the family than tort 
actions. See, e.g., Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (18~5) (property action); 
King v. Sells, 193 Wash. 294, 75 P.2d 130 (1938) (action for money had and received). 
See also McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 431 HARv. L. REV. 1030, 
1057-58 (1930); Note 33 ST.jOHN·SL. REV. 310,310 (1959). 
21 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3678,339 N.E.2d at 913. 
22 See discussion at note 17-18 supra. 
23See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3678, 309 N.E.2d at 914. 
24ld. at 3679, 339 N.E.2d at 914. 
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of plaintiffs contention that the real party III interest IS the de-
fendant's insurer. 25 
Having disposed of the family harmony rationale, the Court then 
examined the second policy in support of parent-child immunity-
fraud and collusion. The Court recognized that when the parties to an 
action cannot truly be said to be adversaries, the process "'becomes 
peculiarly liable to abuse through collusion.' "26 A suit between parent 
and child is susceptible of collusion because the parent will benefit 
both indirectly by the child's recovery in seeing that his child is pro-
vided for, and directly by being relieved of that burden himself. 
The Court found three problems with the collusion argument. First, 
the Court reasoned that the possibility of fraud and collusion is pre-
sent in any action and the judIcial system relies heavily upon the judge 
and jury to weed out fraudulent suitS.27 In this context, the Court 
noted that the fact that the litigants in a particular case are members 
of the same family would serve to make juries more alert for improp-
er conduct than they would be if the parties to a suit were strangers.28 
Second, the Court found that the insurance company could protect it-
self from fraudulent actions by means of a cooperation clause.29 Fi-
nally, the Court acknowledged that while some fraudulent claims 
might suceed, such a possibility should not be sufficient to deny re-
covery in all cases.30 
After rejecting the family harmony and collusion arguments in sup-
port of parent-child immunity, the Court abrogated the doctrine in 
certain specific circumstances. First, under Sorensen, parent-child im-
munity was abrogated only in suits for injuries arising out of au-
tomobile accidents.31 This was so because such conduct did not come 
within an area of parental discretion.32 Second, recovery in a suit be-
tween parent and child was limited to the amount of the parent's lia-
bility insurance.33 Third, recovery was limited to injuries arising out of 
25 See text and note at note 10 supra. 
28 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3679-80, 339 N.E.2d at 914, quoting Luster v. Luster, 299 
Mass. 480, 483, 13 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1938). 
27 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3680,339 N.E.2d at 914. 
2sId. at 3680-81, 339 N.E.2d at 915. 
'9Id. at 3681, 339 N.E.2d at 915. Under such a clause, if the insured was found not 
to be dealing in good faith, the insurer may disclaim liability. Id. The Court suggested 
that a showing of lack of cooperation would be particularly easy in automobile cases be-
cause of the requirement of prompt reporting of accidents to the registry of motor ve-
hicles and prompt investigation by insurance companies. Id. at 3682, 339 N.E.2d at 915. 
3·Id. at 3682-83, 339 N.E.2d at 915. 
31Id. at 3665, 339 N.E.2d at 909. 
32 "Neither parental authority and discipline nor parental discretion is called into 
question by an automobile accident case." Id. at 3683, 339 N.E.2d at 915. For a discus-
sion of the limitation to automobile accidents, see text at notes 61-72 infra. 
331975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3665, 339 N.E.2d at 909. While the Court did not state why 
it was limiting recovery to the amount of insurance, the case suggests two possible 
reasons. The plaintiffs ad damnum in the action against her father was limited to the 
amount of his insurance policy, Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 3, and the Court in 
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negligent actions.34 Finally, immunity was abrogated oply in actions by 
a child against a parent.35 . 
Seven months after the Sorensen decision, the Stjlpreme Judicial 
Sorensen was generally reluctant to decide anything more than wh~t was presently be-
fore it. See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3683-86, 339 N.E.2d at 916-17. Also, since insurance 
was an important element in the Court's rejection of the family h~rmony rationale, m. 
at 3676-79, 339 N.E.2d at 913-14, the Court may not have wan~ed to decide when 
Sorensen was before it whether family harmony would be a sufficient reason for main-
taining immunity in situations where there was no liability insuran~e. The Court, how-
ever, has declined to apply the insurance limitation to the abrogation of interspousal 
suits. In Lewis v. Lewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1764, 1780 nA, 351 N.E.2d 526,533 nA, 
the Court said that the logic of Sorensen did not require such an ~pplication. See note 
53 infra. Lewis would seem to indicate that the abrogation of immurjity does not depend 
upon there being insurance equal to the possible judgment. Most iecently in Pevoski v. 
Pevoski, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2624, 358 N.E.2d 416, Justice Quiri¢o in his concurring 
opinion strongly urged the Court to expressly disavow the ins~rance limitation of 
Sorensen. [d. at 2630, 358 N.E.2d at 418-19. ! 
34 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3665, 339 N.E.2d at 909. Since actionsifor intentional torts 
are already allowed in many jurisdictions, see, e.g., Emery v. Emery,! 45 Cal.2d 421, 430, 
289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 727, 70 S.E.2d 152, 156 
(1952); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 301, 218 P.2d 445, 453 (1950); see also W. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 866 & n.n. 8~, 84 (4th ed. 1971), 
the Court's limitation to negligence actions should not be interpret~d to mean that im-
munity will apply in cases of intentional conduct. It would be iIIogiqal to impose liability 
for conduct which is negligent while at the same time protecting iI1tentionai torts. Mas-
sachusetts has never determined the effect of immunity on intentiqnal conduct. In Lus-
ter v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938), the Court declined to decide the is-
sue. [d. at 484, 13 N.E.2d at 440. I 
35 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3665,339 N.E.2d at 909. As in the insurance limitation, this 
final limitation may have been a function of the Court's reluctanc~ to decide anything 
more than was necessitated by the facts presently before it. [d. at ~683-86, 339 N.E.2d 
at 916-17. See discussion at note 33 supra. It would appear that the reasoning of 
Sorensen would apply with equal force to a suit by a parent against <!I child. In Oliveria v. 
Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 298-99, 25 N.E.2d 766, 767 (1940), the Supreme Judicial Cour~ 
applied the policy rationale in support of domestic harmony enunciated in Luster v. 
Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938), to bar recovery by a p~rent against a child 
for injuries arising out of an automobile accident. In Sorensen, the qourt disposed of the 
rationale used in both Luster and Oliveria and said that both decisions were overruled to 
the extent to which they were inconsistent with Sorensen. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3665, 
339 N.E.2d at 909. The Sorensen reference to both Luster and Oliveria would seem to in-
dicate that the Court will allow recovery on the basis of Sorensen r¢gardless of whether 
the injured party is a parent or a child. It would be inconsistent to allow a child to re-
cover for a parent's negligent driving and to deny recovery by a parent against a child 
in like circumstances. 
Several jurisdictions have allowed a parent to sue a child on the basis of an earlier 
decision which allowed recovery by a child against his parents. Gut~rman v. Guterman, 
66 N.J. 69, 71, 328 A.2d 233, 234 (1974); Gelbman v. Gelbman, ~3 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 
245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531 (1969); Ertl v. Ertl, 30 Wis. 2d 372, 374, 
141 N.E.2d 208, 209 (1966). But see Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 433-34, 142 N.W.2d 
66,75 (1966). i 
There is no comparable limitation raised by the Court in its labrogation of inter-
spousal immunity in Lewis v. Lewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1764, !l51 N.E.2d 526, be-
cause instead of referring to suits by a wife against her husband, I the Court generally 
referred to suits by one spouse against the other. [d. at 1779, 351 ~.E.2d at 532. 
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Court in Lewis v. Lewis36 examined the immunity between husband 
and wife. In Lewis, an automobile accident case, a wife sued her hus-
band for personal injuries sustained while she was a passenger in the 
car he was driving.37 The defendant's motion for summary judgment 
was granted38 on the grounds of common law interspousal immunity 
and section 6 of chapter 209 of the General Laws.39 The Supreme 
Judicial Court granted direct appellate review. 40 On appeal the re-
spondent argued that interspousal immunity, unlike parent-child im-
munity, was codified by the Legislature in section 6 of chapter 209 of 
the General Laws,41 which section gives a marrried woman the right 
to sue as if she were single, with the limitation that the section does 
not "authorize suits between husband and wife except in connection 
with [certain] contracts .... "42 The respondent contended that by in-
clusion of such a limitation with respect to a married woman's right to 
sue, the Legislature meant to bar tort actions between spouses.43 
38 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1764, 351 N.E.2d 526. 
37 [d. at 1765,351 N.E.2d at 527. 
38 Id. 
39 Section 6 provides: "A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner 
as if she were sole; but this section shall not authorize suits between husband and wife 
except in connection with contracts entered into pursuant to the authority contained in 
section two." 
40 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1764-65,351 N.E.2d at 527. The Court granted direct re-
view pursuant to G.L. c. 21OA, § 10(A). 
41 G.L. c. 209, § 6. For the text of § 6 see note 39 supra. 
42 [d. 
43 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1771-73, 351 N.E.2d at 529-30. The claim that G.L. c. 209, 
§ 6 codifies interspousal immunity seems particularly ironic in view of the statute's his-
tory. Interspousal immunity for tort actions was one aspect of a married woman's gen-
erallegal disability. At common law a married woman had no legal identity of her own 
and all legal action had to be taken by her husband. As such, the courts found it 
anomalous to allow actions between husband and wife because in order for a wife to 
sue her husband, the husband would literally have to bring an action against himself. L 
KANOWITZ. WOMEN AND THE LAW 76-77 (1969). Even if such suits were allowed, any re-
covery obtained by the wife would, with the rest of her property, be subject to the con-
trol of the tortfeasor husband. [d. at 77. Beginning in 1839, Married Woman's Acts in 
various forms were passed in all jurisdictions of the United States. [d. at 40. See, e.g., 
N.]. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-6 (1968) (West); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 66 (1976); VA. CODE § 
55-36 (1974). While there was a variation in wording and scope of the statutes among 
jurisdictions, they generally dealt with a woman's right to contract, to sue and be sued 
without her husband, to own and dispose of property and to control her own earnings. 
In short, the Married Woman's Acts gave a woman her own separate legal identity. See 
KANOWITZ. supra at 40. Because the statutes were not uniform, the interpretation of 
their effect upon a woman's right to sue her husband for personal injury varied among 
jurisdictions. Early interpretations of the statutes generally held, for the public policy 
reason of domestic tranquility, that such statutes were to be strictly construed against 
pennitting spouses to sue each other for personal torts. Note, 38 HARV. L. REV. 383, 384 
(1925). Massachusetts Married Women's Act was passed in 1845 and concerned only 
property rights. See Lewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1772 n.2, 351 N.E.2d at 529 n.2. The 
language which respondent in Lewis contended was a legislative codification of in-
terspousal immunity was added by Acts of 1875, c. 184, § 3: "A married woman may 
sue and be sued in the same manner and to the same extent as if she were sole, but 
25
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Therefore, the court was precluded from abolishin~_interspousal im-
munity since any change in the rule must come Irom the Legisla-
ture.44 
The Court disagreed with this interpretation of section 6, finding 
instead that the statute, while evidencing an inten~ to preclude in-
terpretation of the statute as authorizing such suits, I fell short of ex-
pressly forbidding suits between husband and wire. 45 The Court 
noted a previous interpretation of the statute as consistent with this 
reading.46 The Court further determined that the sa~e policy consid-
erations that had supported the immunity betw~en parent and 
child-preserving family harmony and preventing fraudulent 
suits,-had also served to support interspousal immunity.47 As the 
Court had considered and rejected these argumenlts in Sorensen in 
what it termed "the analogous context of parental irrlmunity,"48 it did 
not repeat its reasoning in Lewis.49 
I 
nothing herein contained shall authorize suits between husband land wife." The lan-
guage of the present statute containing an express exception for suits concerning con-
tracts was added in 1963 when the Legislature enacted C.L. c. 209, § 2 (1958), which 
expressly authorized contracts between husband and wife. In effect, the respondent was 
claiming that the statute, which was enacted to sever a woman's legal identity from that 
of her husband, instead made a common law disability statutory. ' 
44 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1772, 351 N.E.2d at 529-30. 
451d. at 1774-75, 351 N.E.2d at 520-31. The defendant also argued that such a 
longstanding rule should be changed by the Legislature rather tha~ by the courts. Id. at 
1777, 351 N.E.2d at 531. The Court rejected this contention notipg that when a judi-
cially created rule is no longer attuned to the needs of society, the courts have both the 
authority and the duty to change the rule. The nature of the common law requires this 
constant process of revitalization.ld. at 1777-79,351 N.E.2d at 531t32. 
<"Id. at 1775-76, 351 N.E.2d at 531, noting e.g., Frankel v. Franktl, 173 Mass. 214, 53 
N .E. 398 (1899). Frankel involved an equitable action between hiusband and wife to 
compel the return of property obtained by fraud. The Court said that the -Married 
Women's statute "does not forbid suits between husband and wife but simply provides 
that it shall not be construed to authorize them." Id. at 215, 53 N.Ei2d at 398. 
<7Id. at 1770, 351 N.E.2d at 529. ' 
<SId. 
'"Id. at 1770-71, 351 N.E.2d at 529. The policy rationales underlying immunity con-
sidered and rejected in Sorensen were the disruption of family harmony and the possibil-
ity of fraudulent and collusive suits being brought in order to recover from an insurer. 
Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3674-83, 339 N.E.2d at 912-15.' As was the case in 
parent-child suits, id. at 3675, 339 N.E.2d at 913, in interspousaI suits the source of dis-
ruption to the family would come not from the suit between husband and wife but 
from the i~ury which precipitated the suit. If, as the Court reasoned in Sorensen, a suit 
would not be brought unless there were insurance to cover the judgment, id. at 3677, 
339 N.E.2d at 913, it would be contrary to the best interests of the family to deny the 
recovery which would restore health to the injured party and peace to the family. Id. at 
3677, 339 N.E.2d at 913. While there is a possibility of collusion when parties are re-
lated, the Court in Sorensen noted that it is the function of the ju<j.icial system to weed 
out fraudulent from meritorious claims. When the parties are par~nt and child, judges 
and juries will be more alert to the possibility of collusion.ld. at 3680-81, 339 N.E.2d at 
915-16. There is no reason to believe judges and juries will be less vigilant in inter-
spousal suits. Finally, insurers may protect themselves by means of I~ cooperation clause 
which would allow them to disavow liability if the insured spouse dif1 not cooperate. See 
~~~. i 
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Thus, III a unanimous decision, the Court, HELD: Interspousal 
immunity will no longer bar an action for injuries arising out of an 
automobile accident.50 As in Sorensen, the Court in Lewis limited the 
abrogation of interspousal immunity to suits arising out of automobile 
accidents.51 In establishing this limitation, the Court noted that some 
activities that would be tortious between strangers may not be so be-
tween husband and wife "because of the mutual concessions implied 
in the marital relationship."52 The Court, however, refused to impose 
the Sorensen requirement that recovery be limited to the amount of 
the tortfeasor's insurance policy for actions between husband and 
wife.53 
The decisions in Sorensen and Lewis add Massachusetts to the grow-
ing list of states that have abrogated, either in whole or in part, the 
family immunity rule. 54 Generally, the jurisdictions that have abro-
.01976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1779-80,351 N.E.2d at 532. 
51 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1780, 359 N .E.2d at 532. 
52 [W]e are mindful that the rights and privileges of husbands and wives with respect 
to one another are not unaffected by the marriage they have voluntarily undertaken to-
gether. Conduct, tortious between two strangers, may not be tortious between spouses 
because of the mutual concessions imJ?lied in the marital relationship. For this reason 
we limit our holding today to claims ansing out of motor vehicle accidents. 
53Id. at 1790 n.4, 351 N.E.2d at 532 n.4. The Court did not indicate why it was not 
applying the insuraqce limitation to interspousal suits. However, in a later case, Pevoski 
v. Pevoski, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2624, 358 N.E.2d 416, Justice Quirico in his concurring 
opinion noted the absence of the insurance limitation in Lewis and urged the Court to 
disavow this limitation expressly. /d. at 2629-30, 358 N.E.2d at 419. 
The Court did not limit its holding to claims arising out of automobile accidents but 
did not specifically refer to negligent conduct as was done in Sorensen. See text and 
footnote at note 35 supra. The decision in Lewis is applicable to suits by husbands 
against their wives because the Court spoke generally of suits between husbands and 
wives rather than specifically about suits by wives against their husbands. Compare Soren-
sen at note 35 supra. 
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes §§ 895G, H, at 72-74, 81-82 
(Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972). At the time of the writing of Tentative Draft 18 of the Re-
statement, fifteen jurisdictions had abrogated parent-child immunity and twenty-one 
had abolished interspousal immunity. Id. Since that time the follow,ing jurisdictions have 
abrogated parent-child immunity to some extent: Sorensen v. Sorensen, 1975 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 3665,339 N.E.2d at 909. Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1,8, 199 N.W.2d 169, 
172-73 (1972) (abrogated for acts of ordinary negligence not involving the reasonable 
exercise of parental authority or discretion); Bahr v. Bahr, 478 S.W.2d 400, 402, (Mo. 
1972) (abrogated to the extent that suit will not disrupt the tranquility of domestic 
establishment or subvert parental control and discipline); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 
397, 405, 528 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1974) (abrogated entirely); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 
473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971) (abrogated for acts of ordinary negligence not involv-
ing the reasonable exercise of parental authority or discretion). For a discussion of the 
limitations on the Massachusetts abrogation, see the text and notes at notes 33-35 supra. 
Since the writing of Tentative Draft 18, interspousal immunity has also been abrogated 
in the following jurisdictions: Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794, 798 
(1972) (abrogated entirely); Lewis v. Lewis, 1976 Mass: Adv. Sh. 1764, 1780, 351 
N.E.2d 526, 532, (for a discussion of the limitations of the Massachusetts abrogation, 
see the text and notes at notes 52-53 supra.); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 404, 528 
P.2d 345, 348 (1973) (abrogated for actions arising out of automobile accidents); Flores 
v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 604, 506 P.2d 345, 348 (1973); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 
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gated family immunity have done so because, as wa~ the case with the 
Massachusetts Court, they no longer found the family harmony or 
fraud and collusion arguments to be compelling reasons for denying 
recovery in the case of tortious injury.55 There hav~ been few jurisdic-
tions, however, that have entirely abolished either parent-child or in-
terspousal immunity.56 The Supreme Judicial Court in both Sorensen 
and Lewis, while restricting their holdings to automobile accidents, 
specifically left open the question of future applica~ion of the abroga-
tion of family immunity to other kinds of condu<jt.57 This note will 
look at three issues raised by the abrogation of family immunity and 
will suggest, in light of both the Court's reasoning in Sorensen and 
Lewis and the experiences of other jurisdictions ~n this area, what 
course the Court should adopt in future cases. More particularly, this 
note will first examine whether the holdings in Sorensen and Lewis 
should be limited to recovery for injuries arising ,out of automobile 
accidents. In this context, the Court's concern for parental discretion58 
and the mutual concessions of marriage59 will be examined in order 
to determine whether and to what extent an extension of the the right 
of recovery to situations not involving automobile ,accidents is justifi-
able. Next, this note will examine whether the holding in Sorensen 
should be made retroactive or prospective.60 Finally, the impact of 
183, 192,500 P.2d 771 (1972) (abrogated entirely). 
For lists of jurisdictions in which, as of 1972, parent-child and interspousal immunity 
were still intact, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. Explanatory Notes §§ 895G, H, at 
76-78,82 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972). . 
55 See, e.g., Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1970j (parent-child); BaIts v. 
Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 429, 430-31, 142 N.W.2d 66,73 (1966) (parent-child); Freehe v. 
Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 187, 188-89,500 P.2d 771, 774-75 (1972) (husband-wife). 
Family harmony and fraud and collusion are the major, but not the sole, arguments 
in favor of immunity. Two other arguments in the parent-child area are that the action 
by a child against a parent would deplete the family exchequer to the detriment of 
other children, and that if the child died the parent would be heir to his own judgment. 
See McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REV. 521, 528-29 (1960). Two 
arguments in the interspousal area are that there is an adequate. remedy in divorce and 
criminal laws, and that allowing such actions would flood the trial courts with marital 
disputes. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 187-88,500 P.2d 771, 774-75 (1972). 
56 For examples of jurisdictions which have not limited their abrogation of immunity, 
see Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962) 
(complete abrogation of interspousal immunity); Petersen v. Oity & County of Hon-
olulu, 51 Haw. 484, 486, 462 P.2d 1007, 1008 (1969) (no restriction on the right of a 
child to sue a parent); Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794, 798 (1972) 
(complete abrogation of interspousal immunity). 
For examples of jurisdictions which have adopted limited abrogations of both im-
munities, see cases cited at note 54 supra. 
57 Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3683-84, 339 N.E.2d at 916; Lewis, 1976 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 1780,352 N.E.2d at 532-33. 
5·Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3683, 339 N.E.2d at 916. 
59 Lewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1780, 351 N .E.2d at 532. . 
60 The Court has already decided that Lewis should be awplied retroactively, see 
Pevoski v. Pevoski, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2624, 2628, 358 N.~.2d 416, 418; see also 
discussion in note 176 infra. 
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Sorensen and Lewis on the right of a parent or spouse to recover medi-
cal expenses incurred by an injured child or spouse will be evaluated. 
I. EXTENSIONS OF LIABILITY WITHIN THE FAMILY 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in abolishing parent-child and in-
terspousal immunity, limited its holding to injuries arising out of au-
tomobile accidents.61 Massachusetts is not the only jurisdiction which 
when abrogating these immunities has so limited its holding.62 While 
the limitation of recovery to automobile accident claims can be sup-
ported by several considerations,63 it does not follow that the au-
·'Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3365, 3683, 339 N.E.2d at 909,916; Lewis, 1976 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1780, 351 N.E.2d at 532. This would seem to indicate a determina-
tion by the Court that the operation of a motor vehicle is outside th~ scope of the family 
relationship as a matter of law, and thus may never be considered an act of parental au-
thority or discretion or an act within the mutual concessions of marriage. This view of 
the automobile in relation to family life is not universally accepted. Some courts have 
refused to hold that the operation of a motor vehicle is outside the family relationship 
as a matter of law, contending instead that it is a factual question whether under the 
circumstances the parent was exercising parental discretion or authority. See Johnson v. 
Myers, 2 III. App. 3d 844, 846, 277 N .E.2d 778, 779-80 (1972). Other courts have at-
tempted to determine whether driving a car was within the scope of the family function 
by looking at the purpose or destination of the trip. See Stevens v. Murphy, 69 Wash. 
939,947, 421 P.2d 668, 673 (1966) (driving children to visit their grandmother was an 
act of parental discretion precluding recovery for injuries sustained during the trip). 
62 See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alas. 1967) (parent-child); Streenz v. 
Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 89, 471 P.2d 282-285 (1970) (parent-child); Immer v. Risko, 56 
N.]. 482, 495, 267 A.2d 481, 488 (1970) (interspousal); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 
56 N.J. 500, 507, 267 A.2d 490, 494 (1970) (parent-child); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 
98, 106, 300 A.2d 637, 641 (1973) (parent-child); Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 
194, 183 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1971) (interspousal); Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 186, 
183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971) (parent-child). 
63 The Court's decision t9 limit the holdings to the facts of the present cases seems 
particularly appropriate due to the concern that there are areas of family life which 
should be free from judicial intrusion. See Lewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1780, 351 
N.E.2d at 532; Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3683-84, 339 N.E.2d at 916. Other 
jurisdictions which have abrogated immunity have restricted the scope of their holdings 
to the cases presently before them, explicitly leaving further definition of the scope of 
the abrogation to future cases. See cases cited in note 62 supra. 
Some of the policy considerations which support the abrogation of immunity may be 
lacking in areas other than automobile accidents. For example, the availability of insur-
ance was a major consideration of the Court in overcoming the argument that suit for 
tortious injury would disrupt family harmony. Lewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1770, 351 
N.E.2d at 529; Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3678-79, 339 N.E.2d at 914. Before ex-
tending recovery to other areas where there is no compulsory insurance, the Court may 
wish to consider the effect of a suit on family harmony when there may be no insur-
ance to cushion the effect of a judgment on the family's resources. Further, in the au-
tomobile area the possibility of bringing frivolous claims is reduced by the existence of 
"no-fault" insurance, which allows recovery of $2000 regardless of fault. See G.L. c. 90, 
§ 34A. See generally Kennedy and McCarthy, "No-Fault" in Massachusetts Chapter 670, Acts 
of 1970, A Synopsis and Analysis, 55 MASS. L. Q. 23, 24 (1970). It would also seem more 
difficult to manufacture a claim with damages over $2000, which would lessen the 
probability of fraudulent suits. 
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tom obi Ie limitation should be a permanent one. Irl both Sorensen and 
Lewis, the Court enunciated a strong public policy !favoring a right of 
recovery for injured parties.64 In light of such a policy, the Court 
noted that it was not adopting a permanent limitation on the right to 
recover,6S but instead was deferring any extensiOI1 of the abrogation 
of immunity to later cases where there would be a specific factual 
situation upon which to base the decision.66 ! 
The Court's refusal to define the parameters of the abrogation of 
immunity leaves future plaintiffs at a loss with respect to whether re-
covery will be allowed in their particular case. THis confusion could 
have been mitigated by the adoption of a distinction between the 
kinds of situations that will give rise to a right to! recover and those 
that will not. The analytical tools for drawing sud~ a distinction were 
provided in both Sorensen and Lewis when the Cour,t spoke in terms of 
protecting areas of parental discretion67 and the mlttual concessions of 
marriage.68 ! 
In this section, it will be suggested that the appropriate distinction is 
one that turns on the source of the duty the patfent or spouse has 
breached in causing the injury in question.69 If th~ duty would only 
arise within the family, then there should be no recovery for negli-
gence. On the other hand, if the conduct in questiion is a breach of a 
duty owed to the world at large, such as the duty, to drive carefully, 
then the fact that a family member rather than a st~anger was injured 
should not prevent recovery. Because there are different judicial con-
cerns regarding the nature of the parent-child and interspl)llsal re-
lationships,7° the appropriate extensions of tort liability bei'Jnd au-
64 In Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3674, 351 N.E.2d at :412, the Court stated: 
"Children enjoy the same legal right to protection and to legal redress for wrongs done 
them as others enjoy. Only the strongest reasons, grounded in nublic policy, can justify 
limitation or abolition of those rights." In Lewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1779, 351 
N.E.2d at 532, the Court stated: "[Ilf there is tortious injury th~re should be recovery, 
and only strong arguments of public policy should justify a judicially created immunity 
for tortfeasors and bar to recovery for injured victims." 
65 In Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3683-84, 339 N.E.2d at 916, the Court stated: 
We are mindful that there may be parental exercises of disdetion and authority 
which should be immune from scrutiny in a court of law. However, we are not 
here confronted with such cases and we need not speculate as, to the scope of our 
holding. That scope will be determined by following the logic and policy of the 
present decision (footnote omitted). 
InLewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1780, 351 N.E.2d at 532-33, the Court stated: "Further 
definition of the scope of the new rule of interspousal tort liability will await develop-
ment in future cases." 
66 See language quoted in note 65 supra. 
67 Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3683, 339 N.E.2d at 916. 
68 Lewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1780,351 N.E.2d at 532. 
69 Recovery in any negligence action is predicated upon there being a breach of duty. 
The duty that lies at the base of any negligence action is an obligation to act in such a 
way as to avoid unreasonable risk to others. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
TORTS §§ 30 at 143 & 53 at 324-27 (4th ed. 1971). ! 
70 In the parent-child area, judicial concern centers around a (ear that judicial inter-
! 
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tomobile iqjury will be analyzed separately for each relatipnship. The 
analysis of the parent-child area will examine the solutions developed 
in Wisconsin, New York, and California,71 and will then suggest a new 
approach. The analysis in the interspousal area will focus on defining 
conduct that is unique to the marriage relationship and which there-
fore should still be protected from judicial intervention. 
A. EXTDiSION Of THE RIGHT TO RECOVER BETWEDI PARE:-iT A:-iD CHILD 
In limiting its holding in Sorensen to claims arising out of an au-
tomobile accident, the Court noted that allowing recovery in such an 
action "[n]either undermines 'parental authority and discipline' ... 
nor threatens substitution of judicial discretion for parental discretion 
in the care and rearing of minor children. Neither parental authority 
and discipline nor parental discretion in child care is called into ques-
tion by an automobile accident case."72 In attempting to strike a bal-
ance between protecting the right of an iqjured party to recover and 
protecting the family processes from undue judicial interference, 
three approaches have been developed. 
l. The Wisconsin Approach. Wisconsin was the first jurisdiction to 
ference in all aspects of that relationship will affect a parent's ability to carry out his 
duty toward the child regarding discipline and control. See, e.g., Borst v. Borst, 41 
Wash. 642, 656, 251 P.2d 149, 156 (1952), where the court articulated this concern as 
follows: 
Parenthood places a grave responsibility upon the father and mother. It is their 
duty to rear and discipline the child .... The duty to discipline the child carries 
with it the right to chastise and to prescribe a course of conduct designed for the 
child's welfare and development. This in turn demands that the parents be given a 
wide sphere of discretion. 
Accord, e.g., Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75, 79, 158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1968) ("The 
parental nonhability is not wanted as a reward, but as a means of enabling the parents 
to discharge the duties whICh society exacts"). The nature of the marital relationship 
precludes concern in the interspousal area regarding authority or control, as society 
generally places no burden on the marriage partners with respect to each other's be-
havior. The focus of the courts' concern over judicial interference with the marriage re-
lationship emanates from a judicial sense that "[t]here are obviously some areas in the 
relationship between husband and wife that courts should not become involved in," 
Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 495, 267 A.2d 481, 488 (1970), rather than there being a 
specific duty to protect or control, as is the case with parent and child. 
71 The appropriateness of looking to the solutions developed by other jurisdictions 
was suggested by the Court in Sorensen. See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3684 n.20, 339 
N.E.2d at 916 n.20. The Court recognized two distinct limitations on the abrogation of 
immunity, that of Wisconsin in Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963), 
and Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3rd 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971). The 
Court indicated that Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 
N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969), may reflect agreement with the Gibson approach. This article will 
take the view that Goller, Gibson and Gelbman are three different and distinct approaches 
to the issue of limiting the abrogation of parent-child immunity. It is difficult to see 
how Gelbman can reflect agreement with Gibson when it was decided two years before 
Gibson. See Bahr v. Bahr, 478 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Mo. 1972). 
72 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3683, 339 N.E.2d at 916, citing Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 
480,481. 13 N.E.2d 438. 439 (1938). 
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abrogate parent-child immunity. In Goller v. White,73 the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court abolished the immunity except: 
( 1) Where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of 
parental authority over the child [hereinafter the "parental 
authority exception"] and (2) where the alleged negligent 
act involves an exercise of ordinary parental 4iscretion with 
respect to the provision of food, clothing, h01Jsing, medical 
and dental services, and other care [hereinafth the "paren-
tal discretion exception"].74 i 
Both of these exceptions have been developed in subsequent cases by 
Wisconsin and other jurisdictions which have adopted the Wisconsin 
approach. 75 
The first exception refers specifically to parental authority and has 
been variously interpreted to mean both discipline and supervision. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has indicated that the first excep-
tion "embraces the area of discipline,"76 but has !lot further defined 
the kind of parental conduct which would be con$idered an exercise 
of discipline. In Michigan, where the Goller excFptions have been 
adopted,77 the state court of appeals determined tltat the parental au-
thority exception, while including discipline, is ~ore accurately de-
scribed as encompassing aspects of supervision.78 The appeals court 
recognized that a parent's authority over a child is intertwined with a 
parent's general duty to protect the child and to teach the child to be 
aware of dangers himself, and that some elements of discipline were 
involved in this general duty.79 The Michigan court also recognized 
that performance of this duty was to a large extent dictated by a par-
ent's unique knowledge and understanding of its <;hild's needs.80 The 
court labelled this general duty as supervision and concluded that 
parental authority encompassed both discipline and supervision.81 
In Wisconsin, the parental discretion exception h~s been interpreted 
73 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). In Goller, the injury arose out of the 
father's operation of a farm tractor. The child was injured while he was riding on the 
drawbar of the tractor while his father was driving.Id. at 404, 122 N.W.2d at 193. 
74Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198. Wisconsin originally stated that both exceptions re-
lated to activities that are "essentially parental." Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75, 79, 
158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1968). Wisconsin has since expressly rejected that definition. 
Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis.2d 629, 632-33, 177 N.W.2d 866, 868 (1970). For 
a discussion of the current Wisconsin definitions of the two exceptions, see the text and 
notes at notes 76, 82-87 infra. 
a See, e.g., Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1,8 199 N.W.2d 169, 172 (1972); Silesky v. 
Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442, 161 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1968). 
76 Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis.2d 231, 246, 201 
N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972). 
77 Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1,8 & n.7, 199 N.W.2d 169, 112 & n.7 (1972). 
78 Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 484, 233 N.W.2d 46,48 (1975). 
79Id. at 484, 233 N.W.2d at 48-49. 
8°Id., 233 N.W.2d at 49. 
81Id. 
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as referring to a parent's performance of legal duties. 82 For example, 
the Wisconsin court after Goller held that failure to teach a child how 
properly to get off a school bus is the type of activity encompassed in 
the parental discretion exception,83 thus precluding recovery, but that 
failure to supervise a child while he played on a swing set is not pro-
tected under the second exception,84 thus allowing recovery against 
the parents.85 The court distinguished the two factual situations by 
stating that the parents' conduct in the school bus case was related to 
furtherance of a legal duty to educate their child,86 and in the swing 
set case no such duty existed.87 
While Wisconsin has interpreted the parental discretion exception 
as being limited to a performance of a parent's legal duties,88 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, which has adopted the Goller exceptions,89 
did not adopt Wisconsin's legal duty standard. The Minnesota court 
has applied the parental discretion exception to two cases involving in-
jury within the home. One case involved a child's injuries from a fall 
on a defective stairway,90 and the other concerned injuries to an in-
fant when she put an electrical cord in her mouth. 91 In both cases, the 
82 Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis.2d 231, 246-47, 201 
N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972). 
8a Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75, 78,158 N.W.2d 341, 343 (1968). 
84 Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis.2d 629, 634, 177 N.W.2d 866, 869 (1970). 
The Court did not determine at that time whether parental supervision might be 
considered a protected activity under the first exception. However, the Wisconsin 
Court's dicta in Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis.2d 231, 
246,201 N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972), seems to preclude that finding as it specifically stated 
that the first exception relates to discipline. But see Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. 
App. 480, 484, 233 N.W.2d 46, 48 (1975). 
85 Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis.2d 629, 635, 177 N.W.2d 866, 869 (1970). 
Cole involved a third party complaint against the parents for contribution by the manu-
facturers of the swing set on which the child was injured alleging the parents' negli-
gence in failing to supervise the child. [d. at 631, 177 N.W.2d at 867. In most cases, a 
parent's supervision of a child will only be an issue in such an action. See, e.g., Paige v. 
Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 481-82, 233 N.W.2d 46, 47 (1975); Ourada v. 
Knahmuhs, 301 Minn. 131, 132, 221 N.W.2d 659, 659 (1974); Thoreson v. Milwaukee 
& Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis.2d 231, 233, 201 N.W.2d 745, 747 (1972). 
86 Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis.2d 231, 246-47, 201 
N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972). A legal duty as defined by the Wisconsin court encompasses 
those parental obligations the omission of which may be prevented by the state upon 
parental failure. Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis.2d 629, 634, 177 N.W.2d 866, 
869 (1970). 
87 Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis.2d 231, 246-47, 201 
N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972). 
88 See text and note at note 82 supra. 
8. Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442,161 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1968). 
90 Ourada v. Knahmuhs, 301 Minn. 131, 131,221 N.W.2d 659, 659 (1974). 
91 Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 94, 203 N.W.2d 352, 353 (1972). Housing is of 
course closely tied to the family's economic status and the type of housing which a par-
ent provides will ultimately depend upon what he is able to afford. See Badigian v. 
Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472,480-81, 174 N.E.2d 718, 721-22, 215 N.Y.S.~d 35, 42 (1961) 
(Fuld. J.. dissenting). 
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Minnesota court found that the conduct involved fell within Goller's 
parental discretion exception, and hence there cou~d be no recovery.92 
These cases involved different types of discretiOnjry acts by the par-
ent, one being concerned with a parent's choice of he dwelling itself93 
and the other with the relatively minor decision 0 whether or not to 
use an extension cord.94 In light of the quite liberal manner in which 
Minnesota has approached such cases, there does pot seem to be any 
activity within the home which could not be indu<lled in the scope of 
parental discretion. i 
There are several problems with the Goller app~oach. The Wiscon-
sin interpretation of the parental authority excepti~n as relating to di-
scipline is too narrow for two reasons. First, disn·Pline, as adminis-
tered by a parent, may be defined as the use of easonable force in 
order to control, educate, or train a child.95 A pare t already has a le-
gally recognized privilege to discipline irrespective I of the doctrine of 
parental immunity.96 Therefore, restricting the pa*nt-child immunity 
exception to discipline has the practical effect of mcitking the exception 
meaningless.97 Second, it seems contradictory on thie part of the Goller 
court to formulate an exception to the abrogati~n of immunity in 
terms of negligent conduct,98 and then to define the exception solely 
in terms of discipline, which would seem to copstitute intentional 
rather than negligent conduct. The Michigan inierpretation of the 
first exception which includes parental supervision: seems more realis-
tic. However, the Michigan court has not yet defided the parameters 
of the first exception. Rather, it has approached the definition on a 
case by case basis.99 There is no dear indication, :therefore, of what 
kinds of conduct besides supervision will be indurled in the Michigan 
interpretation of the exception. The problem witli this result is that 
the term "supervision" itself provides no dear guidelines with respect 
to the type of conduct which will be protected. 
With respect to the parental discretion exception, the Wisconsin 
view that that exception is limited to the exercise of legal duties100 is 
too restrictive because it allows the parent's judgm~nt concerning the 
best course for his child to be supplanted by that of the jury in areas 
92 Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 95, 203 N.W.2d 352, 353 (1972); Ourada v. 
Knahmuhs, 301 Minn. 131, 133,221 N.W.2d 659 660 (1974). 
·'See Ourada v. Knahmuhs, 301 Minn. 131, 133,221 N.W.2d659, 660 (1974). 
94 See Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 95, 203 N.W.2d 352, 353 (1972) . 
• 5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) at" TORTS § 147 (1965). 
96/d. at § 147, comment bat 266. 
97 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 8~5H, comment j at 89 
(Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972). . 
98 20 Wis.2d at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198. I 
99 See, e.g., Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 485t86, 233 N.W.2d 46, 49 
(1975). 
100 Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 ~is.2d 231, 246-47, 201 
N.W.2d 745, 753 (1975). I 
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that do not constitute legal duties, to-wit, areas comprised of what 
may be still uniquely parental functions. For example, under the Wis-
consin interpretation, a parent may be liable for failing to supervise 
his child because the second exception "does not extend to the ordi-
nary acts of upbringing .... "101 Parental supervision, however, goes 
to the heart of the parent-child relationship and the amount of super-
vision a child needs is something which only a parent can 
determine.102 Therefore, it is the type of conduct that should be free 
from judicial scrutiny and to which the immunity should apply. 
While the Wisconsin interpretation of the parental discretion excep-
tion seems too limited to protect adequately conduct which is unique 
to the family-such as supervision, the Minnesota interpretation is 
too broad. Denying recovery for all accidents within the home103 pro-
tects conduct for which the parent would be liable to a stranger. Min-
nesota, however, purports to endorse a distinction between obligations 
generally owed all people and those occurring within the family.104 If 
the Minnesota court had actually applied this distinction it would 
seem that recovery should have been allowed in the stairway case105 
because the duty to keep property safe is one "which the law imposes 
upon everyone in all his relations to his fellow men, and for the 
breach of which it gives a remedy."106 However, in the case of the ex-
tension cord,107 it would seem that since there was no allegation of a 
defect in the apparatus,108 the concern was really over the parent's 
failure to supervise, and thus would be conduct unique to the 
parent-child relationship. 
These problems indicate the varying interpretations that may be 
given to Goller. Under Goller, courts purportedly applying the same 
exceptions have reached different and sometimes contradictory re-
101Id. at 246-47, 201 N.W.2d at 753. 
102 See Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 485, 233 N.W.2d 46, 49 (1975), 
where the court stated: "Allowing a cause of action for negligent supervision would en-
able others, ignorant of a case's peculiar familial distinctions and bereft of any stan-
dards, to second-guess a parent's management of family affairs .... " 
103See Ourada v. Knahmuhs, 301 Minn. 131, 133, 221 N.W.2d 659, 660 (1974); 
Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93,95,203 N.W.2d 352, 353 (1972). 
104 While it is beyond the scope of this article to examine in detail the changes in 
property law regarding the duty to repair premises as between a landlord and tenant, it 
would seem unrealistic in any case to place a greater burden on the property owner to-
ward his family than he has generally toward others entering the premises. Cherry v. 
Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 95, 203 N.W.2d 352, 353 (1972). 
105 Ourada v. Knahmuhs, 301 Minn. 131, 221 N.W.2d 659 (1974). See text at notes 
90-94 supra. 
106 Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 95, 203 N.W.2d 352,353 (1972), quoting Lemmen 
v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75, 79,158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1968). 
107 Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 203 N.W.2d 352 (1972). See text at notes 90-94 
supra. 
1118 Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 94, 203 N.W.2d 352, 353. The facts of the case 
stipulated that there was no defect in the lamp, cord, or socket. The mother's alleged 
negligence seemed to be centered around the fact that she left the child alone in the 
room knowing that the'child had on occasion played with the cord. See id. 
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suIts. The terminology is ambiguous and is therefore difficult for 
courts to apply to particular factual situations. 109 A rule that allows 
such contradictory interpretationsllo would seem to offer very little 
guidance to courts expected to apply it. 
2. The California Approach. The California Suprf:!me Court when 
abrogating its forty year old doctrine of parent-child immunity in Gib-
son v. Gibson 111 was also concerned with the need to protect parental 
authority and discretion. 112 The court approved Of the Goller ap-
proach in that Goller recognized that in some respetts a parent-child 
relationship is unique, and that "traditional concepts of negligence 
cannot be blindly applied to it."1l3 The court declir,ed, however, to 
adopt Goller for two reasons. First, the California court objec'ted to the 
Wisconsin formulation because it would entail drawi~g distinctions be-
tween those particular classes of conduct that would give rise to liabil-
ity between parent and child and those that would not. The court 
found such a procedure to be inherently arbitraryY4 Second, the 
California court wanted to avoid adopting a standard that would allow 
a parent to act negligently with impunity once he had succeeded in 
bringing himself within the range of protected conduct. lI5 
The test for recovery adopted by the California court is "what 
would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in simi-
lar circumstances?"1l6 Under this approach, no conquct is per se ex-
empted from liability because it relates to discipline or some other ar-
guably parental function. In addition, all conduct, eyen that which is 
clearly nonparental, appears to be subject to the sam~ test.1l1 Presum-
ably, this test would avoid the problems that the California court 
found in Goller because there would be no need to make any distinc-
tion between parental and nonparental conduct, and there would be 
no sphere within which a parent could act negligently with 
impunity.l18 
1119 See Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 484, 233 N.W.2d 46, 48 (1975). 
III. Compare Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75, 79, 158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1968), with 
Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis.2d 629, 632-33, 177 N.W.2d 866, 868 (1970). 
III 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2~8 (1971). The facts of the case, while 
essentially arising out of an automobile accident, also involved elements of parental dis-
cretion. The complaint alleged that the father, driving a car while towing a jeep, negli-
gently stopped on a highway at night and told his minor son to go out and straighten 
the wheels of the jeep. As the son was performing this task, he was struck by another 
vehicle and was injured. /d. at 916, 479 P.2d at 648-9, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 288-89, (1971). 
112 Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292. 
113Id. 
114 Id. at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. The Court did not explain why 
the Goller exceptions would result in arbitrary distinctions. 
115Id. 
116Id. at 921,479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (emphasis in Qriginal). 
117 Otherwise, in order to trigger the reasonable parent standard, 'the court would still 
have to make a threshold determination as to whether the conduct 'jVas parental. 
118 See Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at ~93. 
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The California approach is unsatisfactory because it fails adequately 
to protect from judicial scrutiny the performance of parental duties. 
In an attempt to avoid what is considered to be the arbitrary dis-
tinctions in Goller119 , the Caliiornia court has thrown open every de-
tail of family life to judicial inspection. Thus under the California ap-
proach, while liability will be imposed only upon a determination that 
a parent has acted unreasonably, in order to make such a determina-
tion the actions of every parent, whether or not later found to be rea-
sonable, are potentially reviewable by judges and juries. Further-
more, a parent's decision as to what course of action to follow for his 
child is often based on facts peculiarly within a parent's knowledge 
and cannot be measured by an objective standard.120 For example, a 
parent's determination of the amount of supervision required by a 
particular child is based upon the parent's knowledge of the child's 
needs and habits. Moreover, the California court did not define what 
would constitute "acting negligently with impunity," and thus gave no 
indication of the kind of conduct with which the court was con-
cerned.121 However, there are two ways to delineate the conduct in 
question. First, it would seem that such conduct which would qualify 
as acting negligently with impunity would come very close to being 
willful and wanton and, if so, would not be protected by parental im-
munity.122 Second, if the court was reluctant to protect parental con-
duct which was more than ordinarily negligent, such a limitation could 
have been expressly applied. This way, the court would have avoided 
subjecting every aspect of the parent-child relationship to judicial 
scrutiny. 
3. The New York Approach. The approach taken by New York with 
respect to the abolition of parent-child immunity [hereinafter the "for-
tuitous facts" approach] was first enunciated by the Court of Appeals 
in Holodook v. Spencer. 123 Although the doctrine of parent-child im-
munity had first been abolished in Gelbman v. Gelbman,124 it was not 
until the later development in Holodook that the contours of the New 
York approach took shape. 
In Gelbman, a suit arising out of an automobile accident, a mother 
recovered for personal injuries from her driver-son. 125 In Holodook, 
119 See id. 
120 See text and note at note 113 supra. See also Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 
429,40 N.E.2d 236, 238, 32 N.Y.S.2d 424, 429 (1942), where the Court stated that: 
[I)f within the wide scope of daily experiences common to the upbringing of a 
child a parent may be subjected to a suit for damages for each failure to exercise 
care commensurate with the risk-for each injury caused by inattention, unwise 
choice or even selfishness-a new and heav,' burden will be added to parenthood. 
121 3 Cal. 3d at 921,479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. 
122 See note 34 supra. 
123 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974). 
124 23 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194,297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (1967). 
125Id. at 436, 245 N.E.2d at 192,297 N.Y.S.2d at 529. 
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! 
the court had to decide whether Gelbman should be e~tended to allow 
a child to recover from a parent because of a p~rent's negligent 
supervision.126 In reaching its decision, the Holodook Fourt first noted 
that Gelbman did not make any exceptions for the ex~rcise of parental 
authority or discretion. 127 The court distinguis~ed the facts in 
Gelbman, which supported recovery, from the c~rcumstances in 
Holodook. In the former case the conduct giving rise 1;0 recovery was a 
breach of a duty to drive carefully, a duty owed to ~he whole world; 
while in Holodook, the conduct, parental supervision, ~ould only arise 
within the family relationship and "goes to its very heart."128 The 
court suggested that another way of looking at the di~tinction between 
conduct giving rise to recovery and that which does II10t is to ask how 
important the parent-child relationship was tol the particular 
conduct.129 If the relationship was simply a "fortuitous fact,"130 then 
recovery should be allowed. If, on the other hand, the circumstances 
were such that they would only arise in the parent-c~i1d relationship, 
recovery should be denied. 131 'I 
The Holodook approach was applied by an inter~ediate appellate 
New York court in Agin v. Likens.132 In that case, a jchild's guardian 
brought negligence actions against the mother's estat~ and against the 
driver of an automobile who struck and injured £e child as the 
mother carried the child across the street.133 The ourt denied re-
covery against the mother's estate, finding that the cision to pick a 
child up and carry her across the street comes wit in the Holodook 
sphere of immunity and should not be reviewed by t~e court.134 Fur-
thermore, the court found that the circumstances of the particular 
case would arise rarely, if at all, outside of the parent-child re-
lationship. Thus, it could hardly be said to be a fortui~(>us fact that the 
child was being carried by her mother rather than a s~ranger.135 
The New York approach developed in Holodook is ~ost satisfactory 
because it focuses on the particular parental condudt that the court 
wants to protect rather than predicating recovery upon judicial con-
cepts either of parental discretion and authority136 dr of the reason-
able parent. 137 The Holodook principle will only protect conduct 
128 36 N.Y.2d at 39, 324 N.E.2d at 339, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 862. Holodook was a consoli-
dation of three cases in which children sustained injuries while under the care of their 
parents. /d. 
127Id. at 43-44, 324 N.E.2d at 342, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 865. 
128Id. at 51,324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871. 
129 See id. 
130Id. 
131 See id. 
132 81 Misc. 2d 690, 366 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1975). 
133Id. at 690, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 799. 
134/d. at 692, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 800. 
135Id. 
138 See text at notes 73-108 supra. 
137 See text at notes 116-22 supra. 
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unique to the parent-child relationship. Once the conduct involves ac-
tions for which a parent would be liable to a stranger, the parent-child 
relationship becomes irrelevant for purposes of determining liabil-
ity.138 This approach is unambiguous because it simply requires the 
court to determine whether the parent-child relationship was essential 
to the conduct in question or whether it was simply a fortuitous fact. 
There is no problem of extensive judicial interference with the family 
because that conduct which is unique to the family would be exempt 
from judicial scrutiny. The New York approach also parallels the ap-
proach suggested early in this note,139 which would allow recovery 
when the conduct involved was a breach of a duty owed to the world 
at large. If a duty of care is owed to the world at large, then the fact 
that the breach results in injury to a family member may be said to be 
fortuitous and irrelevant to a determination of liability. 
4. Proposed Massachusetts Approach. Massachusetts should model 
any extension of the rule in Sorensen on the approach taken by New 
York.140 The Court in Sorensen declined to determine the scope of its 
holding. 141 When this scope is defined, it should be done in a way 
which will best effectuate the three basic policy considerations that led 
the Court in Sorensen to abrogate the immunity. First, the Court rec-
ognized that injured children have a right to recover for their negli-
gently inflicted injuries, regardless of whether the tortfeasor was a 
stranger or a parent.142 Here, the Court seems to indicate that gener-
ally the right of recovery against a family member should correspond 
to the right of recovery that would exist against a stranger. Second, 
balanced against the Court's concern for a child's right of recovery is 
the necessity perceived by the Sorensen Court of preserving an area of 
parental discretion and authority "immune from scrutiny in a court of 
law."143 In this context, the Court must define a sphere of activity in-
volving conduct unique to the parent-child relationship which should 
138 In Holodook, 36 N.Y.2d at 50,324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871, the court 
stated: "Of course, where the duty is ordin<,.rily owed, apart from the family relation, 
the law will not withhold its sanctions merely because the parties are parent and child." 
Holodook's fortuitous fact approach was criticized by an intermediate appellate court in 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 85 Misc.2d 734, 380 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1976). The Court 
was dissatisfied with the Holodook test, which denied recovery against a parent for neg-
ligent supervision, and stated that this result "is by no means a firm platform to base a 
more general deprival of rights by demonstrably injured children." Id. at 736, 380 
N .Y.S.2d at 925. The Allstate case involved an action by a daughter against her mother 
for injuries sustained when the mother gave the car to the unlicensed daughter. Id. at 
737,380 N.Y.S.2d at 926. The Court in Allstate, applying the Holodook test, allowed re-
co~ery because, in the court's opinion, the conduct involved in entrusting a dangerous 
instrumentality to someone is in no way dependent on the family relationship. Id. at 
740, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 929. 
139 See text at notes 69-70 supra. 
'.0 See text and notes at notes 123-39 supra. 
141 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3683-84, 339 N.E.2d at 916. 
142Id. at 3674, 339 N .E.2d at 912. See supra note 64. 
143 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3683. 339 N.E.2dat 916. 
39
Smith: Chapter 5: Torts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1976
140 1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETtS LAW §5.10 
not be subject to review by the courts. Finally, bec~use the Court in-
dicated that in most suits within the family the parties will be looking 
to insurance to create a fund for recovery,144 the CQurt must provide 
some kind of reliable standard that will permit pa~ents to purchase 
adequate insurance and that will allow insurers to; adjust their pre-
miums and policies in preparation for future liability~ 145 
These policy considerations can best be served by ladopting the fol-
lowing test for recovery: recovery should be allowe~ between parent 
and child when the duty breached is one which could arise even in the 
absence of a family relationship. If the cause of actioin would not arise 
but for the family relationship, no recovery should b~ allowed. Such a 
rule would give the injured family member the same right to recover 
that all other parties would have, thereby promotipg the expressed 
policy in Sorensen that children have the same rig~ts to "protection 
and to legal redress for wrongs done them as !others enjoy."146 
At the same time, conduct unique to the family situation would be 
protected from judicial intervention, thereby prompting the second 
policy consideration of preserving an area of paren~al authority and 
discretion free from extrafamilial scrutiny.147 For ex~mple, under this 
proposed test a parent's failure to supervise a child Iproperly will not 
result in recovery because supervision is generally conduct that arises 
only within the family. Finally, since the right to recqver between par-
ent and child would correspond to the right to recovtr between stran-
gers, insurers could gauge the extent of future liability on the basis of 
past experience. 148 Thus, the Court's third policy 'consideration of 
providing a reliable standard of liability for both insurers and insured 
would be satisfied. 149 I 
The Court may wish to make a further distinctiOli regarding gross 
negligence,150 so that a parent who negligently order~ his or her child 
IHld. at 3678-79, 339 N.E.2d at 914. 
145 The need for a stable standard precludes a case by case weighing of factors in 
order to determine whether on the particular facts recovery should be allowed. This 
was the approach chosen by Missouri in Bahr v. Bahr, 478 S.W.2d ~OO, 402 (Mo. 1972), 
after rejecting the approaches in Goller, Gibson and Gelbman. 
146 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3674, 339 N.E.2d at 912. Nothing in Sorensen indicated a 
policy of giving injured family members a greater right to recover. 
147 See text at note 143 supra. 
148 While this approach will limit insurers' liability to the type of conduct for which 
they are presently writing policies, it should not be assumed that parent-child liability 
will be problem-free from an actuarial point of view. The incidence of parent-child in-
jury may be greater than the incidence of il1iury between strangers: because one is more 
likely to be driving with a family member than a stranger. On the other hand, parents 
might take greater care in activities in which their children are invQlved. As a result, in-
surers may need time to adjust their rates. This issue is relevant te a determination of' 
the retroactive application of Sorensen. See discussion at notes 201-2p3 infra. 
149 See text at notes 152-53, 144-45 supra. : 
150 This view of gross negligence involves conduct in which the aftor has failed to ex-
ercise even slight care but which lacks the element of willfulness ntcessary to make the 
conduct intentional and thus unprotected by immunity. See g~nerally W. PROSSER. 
HANDBOOK Of' THE LAW Of' TORTS, § 34, at 183-86 (4th ed. 1971). ' 
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to perform a particularly hazardous task may not shield such conduct 
by saying that it could only arise in the context of the parent-child re-
lationship. Parents must be given a good deal of discretion in deter-
mining how to bring up their children. Society as a whole, as well as 
individual family members, benefits from a system that prohibits ex-
cessive outside interference because such a system allows each family 
unit to develop according to the needs of its members. Acts of ordi-
nary negligence may not be an abuse of the discretion which society 
gives the family. A parent who is grossly negligent, however, cannot 
be said to be acting in the child's best interests and his conduct no 
longer merits protection. 
B. EXTENSIONS OF THE RIGHT TO RECOVER BETWEEN SPOUSES 
The Court in Lewis, as it had done in Sorensen, chose not to extend 
its holding to situations not involving automobile accidents. The Lewis 
Court reasoned that "[c]onduct, tortious between two strangers, may 
not be tortious between spouses because of the mutual concessions 
implied in the marital relationship."151 The Court did not elaborate, 
however, upon the kind of conduct that might be included within 
such mutual concessions. Therefore, the Court did not explicitly indi-
cate what, if any, type of conduct besides that presented by the facts 
of Lewis would justify the abrogation of interspousal immunity. 
In Lewis, recovery was allowed for the negligent operation of a 
motor vehicle. 152 The duty to drive carefully exists regardless of the 
relationship between the tortfeasor and the injured party. Lewis, 
therefore, suggests that injured spouses should be placed on the same 
footing as injured strangers.153 Certain limitations, however, to such a 
[5[ 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1780, 351 N.E.2d at 532. Some states have abrogated in-
terspousal immunity entirely. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d 70, 
72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962); Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794, 
798 (1972); Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 44, 187 N.W.2d 236, 238 (1971). But see 
Immer v. Risko, 56 N.]. 482, 495, 267 A.2d 481, 488 (1970) (abrogation limited to au-
tomobile accidents). It should be noted that except for Klein, which involved injuries 
sustained by a wife when she slipped on the deck of a pleasure boat, all of the cases ab-
rogating interspousal immunity arose out of automobile accidents. Thus, few courts 
have had to apply the abrogation to other circumstances. When other factual circum-
stances are presented, courts that have abrogated the immunity entirely in automobile 
accident cases may decide to limit the abrogation in other situations. See Paiewonsky v. 
Paiewonsky, 446 F.2d 178, 181 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1971). 
[ 52 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1780, 351 N.E.2d at 532. 
[53 For example, the Court's holding in Lewis could be applied to a property owner's 
duty to make his property reasonably safe for all lawful visitors. Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 
Mass. 693, 707, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (1973). If a property owner creates or allows a 
dangerous condition to exist on the property and one's spouse rather than a stranger is 
injured, there is no concession based upon the marriage which should bar recovery. 
While there is no case law on this point, it is interesting to note that Klein v. Klein, 58 
Cal.2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962), the case which abrogated inter-
spousal immunity in California for negligent torts, arose out of an accident on the hus-
band's pleasure boat and the plaintiff-wife took great care to establish the fact that the 
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broad suggestion must be considered. Thus, before adopting a blan-
ket abrogation of interspousal immunity one must inquire whether 
the relationship mandates a more restrictive approach than was taken 
in the parent-child area. l54 In adopting a rule of recovery in the in-
terspousal area, it is not sufficient to say that suits between husbands 
and wives will be allowed for any conduct which would have provided. 
a cause of action against a stranger because there are rights which are 
protected from interference by third parties that have as their founda-
tion the marriage relationship. To allow interspousal action of those 
rights would be to bring judicial scrutiny into the heart of the mar-
riage. For example, the right to recover for loss of consortiuml55 and 
interference with a marriagelS6 gives a spouse a cause of action 
against a third party when he loses the society, affection, and compan-
ionship of his spouse through the negligent or intentional conduct of 
that third party.l57 The rights protected by these actions exist only be-
cause of the marriage relationship. The affection and companionship 
attendant to a marriage are given freely without legal compulsion.lss 
The law protects a spouse's right to the benefits of a marriage from 
tortious interference by third parties, but because the duty to provide 
consortium benefits springs, if at all, from the marriage relationship, a 
spouse should not be liable for negligently or intentionally withhold-
ing them.ls9 Allowing recovery for the breach of such duties by a 
spouse would bring judicial intervention into the very basis of the 
marriage. l60 Such a result seems contrary to Lewis' recognition that 
some "[c]onduct, tortious between two strangers, may not be tortious 
husband owned the boat prior to the marriage and that she had no interest in it. Id. at 
693, 376 P.2d at 71, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 103. Considerations of the spouse's own possible 
contributory negligence in allowing the condition to exist is beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. However, it should be noted that any interpretation of mutual concessions of mar-
riage as involving a kind of assumption of the risk by the parties to a marriage would 
seem to be precluded by G.L. c. 231 § 85 which abolished the defense of assumption of 
the risk. But if. McGlothlin v. McGlothlin, 476 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) 
(Cadena, J., concurring) ("I have full faith in the ability of our judiciary to fashion what 
may be loosely described as a doctrine of 'assumed risk' applicable to husband-wife re-
lations."). 
154 See text at notes 140-150 supra. 
155 Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1263, 1278, 302 N.E.2d 555, 564. 
156 White v. Thomson, 324 Mass. 140, 142,85 N.E.2d 246, 247 (1949). 
157 Unlike Sorensen, the Lewis decision contained no language indicating a restriction 
of the holding to negligent torts. See text and note at note 53 supra. 
158See Plain v. Plain, Min. ,240 N.W.2d 330, 331-32 (1976) (husband's action 
against his wife for loss of consortium due to her negligent driving denied). 
159Id. at ,240 N.W.2d at 332. See also Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 
COLUM. L. REV. 651, 652 (1930) ("As between the parties to the marriage, consortium 
plays no part."). 
160 See Paiewonsky v. Paiewonsky, 446 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1971), where the court de-
nied recovery by a wife against her husband for fraudulently inducing her to enter into 
a marriage. Although the court decided the case on the basis of the jurisdiction's Mar-
ried Woman's Act, it also noted that the circumstances of the case presented a claim 
"going to the basis of the marital relationship." Id. at 181 n.4. 
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between spouses because of the mutual concessions implied in the 
marital relationship."161 The "mutual concessions" referred to by the 
Court in Lewis should be interpreted as referring to those rights and 
duties accruing to marriage partners because of their relationship. 
Thus, the Court should decline to extend the abrogation of inter-
spousal immunity to allow legal enforcement of such rights and 
duties. 
The test for recovery in the interspousal area should focus on 
whether the "duty" breached,162 giving rise to the injury for which re-
covery is sought, exists solely because of the marital relationship.163 If 
the particular duty, for example consortium, is found only within the 
marital relationship, then recovery should be denied. If, on the other 
hand, the duty breached would afford the injured spouse recovery 
against a stranger, then the fact that the tortfeasor is a spouse should 
not bar recovery. Besides allowing recovery in all cases where the 
conduct does not arise out of the marital relationship, this approach 
would also effectuate the policy considerations underlying the abroga-
tion of immunity which the Court enunciated in Sorensen 164 in the 
parent-child area. Such a result is desirable in light of the Court's 
conclusion in Lewis that the two immunities are "analogous."165 
Further, this test would give spouses the same rights as others to re-
cover for their injuries while at the same time it would protect those 
rights unique to the marriage.166 This approach would also give in-
surers a reliable indication of the scope of their potential liability be-
cause recovery would be allowed between husband and wife for the 
same conduct for which the insurer presently writes policies. 167 This 
approach supports the public policy enunciated in both Sorensen and 
Lewis supporting recovery by injured victims168 without encroaching 
on conduct which is unique to the family.169 
161 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1780, 351 N.E.2d at 532. 
162 See text and note at note 69, supra. 
163 See McGlothlin v. McGlothlin, 476 S. W.2d 333, 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) 
(Cadena, j., concurring) ("I would affirm the [dismissal] ... solely on the ground that 
the 'duty' allegedly breached by defendant springs from the existence of the marital re-
lationship .... "). . 
16'See text supra at notes 142-45. 
165 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1770, 351 N .E.2d at 529. The Court referred to the 
"analogous" context of the two immunities in regard to the policies which had sup-
ported them. It would appear then that the same considerations would apply in de-
termining limitations on abrogation. 
166 This approach would parallel the approach taken in the parent-child area where 
activities which would not have been carried out but for the parent-child relationship 
are still protected by the immunity. See text at notes 140-150 supra. 
167 See text at note 148 supra. 
168 Lewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1779,351 N.E.2d at 532; Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 3674, 339 N.E.2d at 912. 
169 Lewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1780,351 N.W.2d at 532; Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 3683,339 N.E.2d at 916. 
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II. RETROACTIVE OR PROSPECTIVE ApPLICATION 
Traditionally changes in the common law were retroactive,170 but 
within the last fifty years171 the courts have developed prospective 
overruling to protect parties who have relied upon the old law.172 In 
Sorensen, the Court specifically declined to decide the issue of retroac-
tivity, stating: "We need not decide whether [our] ... holding is to be 
given retroactive or prospective effect; we leave consideration of that 
question to a future case where the issue is fully argued by the 
parties."173 In Lewis the issue of retroactive versus prospective applica-
tion was not mentioned.174 However, in a case decided after Lewis, 
170 The retroactive application of judicial decisions is based on the notion that the law 
itself is unchanging and that the new rules which judges expound are simply the results 
of the judicial effort to find that law. See Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective 
bverruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1,2 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Levy). 
171 Levy, supra note 170 traces the origin of the concept to an address given by 
George F. Canfield in 1917. Levy, supra note 170 at 7. 
172 The concept of prospective overruling has generated a great deal of scholarly dis-
cussion. See Levy, supra note 170, at 16-21. "Pure" prospective overruling allows a court, 
when confronted with a rule which is outdated or unjust, to decline to overturn the 
rule in the present case, but announce that a new rule will be applied in all future 
cases. See Colby v. Carney Hosp., 356 Mass. 527, 528 254 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1969) (Mas-
sachusetts application of purely prospective overruling to charitable immunity); 
Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts",' Techniques fil Prospective Overruling, 42 N,V.U. L. 
RE\'. 631, 638-40 (1967). Two of the major problems with pure prospective overruling 
are (I) the new rule would be mere dictum, and (2) that plaintiffs would be disinclined 
to appeal if they could not reap the benefits of their effort. Levy, supra note 170, at 19. 
Since the Court in both Sorensen and Lewis abrogated the immunity doctrines as to those 
cases, pure prospective overruling is not an issue. For the purposes of this section, pro-
spectivity will refer to the method of overruling by which a court in overruling a doc-
trine applies the new rule to both the present case and to cases arising in the future. See 
Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 434, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (1966). (The defense of parent-
child immunity "is abrogated in all actions by a parent against a child arising out of 
torts committed from and after this date."). 
173 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3685-86, 339 N.E.2d at 916. Similarly, the court did not 
decide the issue of retroactivity in Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N .E.2d 43 
(1973), when abrogating the common law rule that a property owner owed a lesser duty 
to social guests than to business invitees. The Court did not decide the retroactive ap-
plication of that rule until two years later in Bouchard v. DeGagne, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1856, 1861-63,329 N.E.2d 114, 116-17. This case was discussed in Smith, Torts, 1975 
A~~. SL'R\,. M.\ss. LAW § 1.1, at 3-5. 
174 Declining to decide the retroactivity of a new rule at the same time the Court 
adopts the rule would seem to have two beneficial results. The Court mentioned the 
first result in Sorensen when it noted that at a future date the issue of retroactivity 
would be fully argued. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3686, 339 N.E.2d at 917. This is an 
especially important consideration in the Immunity area. The existence of liability in-
surance was an important factor in the Court's determination that immunity' was no 
longer necessary to protect the family. Lewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1770,351 N.E.2d 
at 519; Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3675-76,339 N.E.2d at 913. Retroactive appli-
cation of the holdings in Sorensen and Lewis will affect not only the right of individual 
plaintiffs to recover but also will affect the obligation of their insurers. By withholding 
the decision on retroactivity, the Court will allow insurers to present, through amicus 
briefs, the effe~ that retroactivity will have on their obligations and rates and will thus 
present the Court with a fuller picture of the ramifications of retroactivity. The second 
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Pevoski v. Pevoski,175 the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the 
holding in Lewis should be applied retroactively.l76 While Pevoski set-
tles the issue of retroactivity in interspousal actions, it does not settle 
the issue in the parent-child area. 177 This section will focus on 
whether the Court's decision in Sorensen should be made retroactive. 
A. THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF RETROACTIVITY 
In Massachusetts, the effect of the retroactive application of changes 
in tort law has been restricted by the operation of the statute of limita-
tions. 178 For example, in Bouchard v. De Gagne,179 the Supreme Judi-
cial Court, in giving retroactive effect to the rule that a landowner 
owe!\ all. lawful visitors a duty of reasonable care, stated: "Where the 
claim for the physical injuries has been concluded by ... the running 
of the statute of limitations prior to the rendering of this opinion, the 
[new rule] is not to be regarded as in any way benefitting or reviving 
a plaintiff's action."18o Therefore, the number of claims that could be 
brought under a retroactive application of the abrogation of parent-
child immunity would appear to be limited to those claims arising 
within three years prior to the date on which retroactivity was de-
cided.1s1 There are, however, two factors that would seem to indicate 
that the statute of limitations is not an absolute bar. 
Under the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure,182 a plaintiff can 
join a cause of action with a pending case and have the new claim re-
late back to the date of the original pleading, thereby avoiding the stat-
benefit of the Court's action in declining to decide retroactivity is that it mitigates the 
abruptness of a sudden change of established common law doctrine. It would serve to 
put all parties on notice that the new rule may be retroactively applied in the future 
and gives them the chance to prepare for that eventuality. 
175 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2624, 358 N.E.2d 416. 
176Id. In Pevoski, the Court held that Lewis would apply to claims arising from au-
tomobile accidents "which have not been disposed of by settlement or judgment or the 
running of the statute of limitations." Id. at 2628, 358 N.E.2d at 418. The Court noted 
that by limiting retroactivity to "existing" claims there would be no unfair impact on 
those who relied on the old rule. Id. This seems to indicate a belief that retroactivity will 
not result in an inordinate number of claims being brought. 
177 Schwartz v. U.S. Rubber Corp., 112 N.]. Super. 595, 601, 272 A.2d 310, 314 
(1972) ("there may be valid reasons for applying a prospective-only rule to child versus 
parent tort cases and not to husband-wife litigation .... "). 
17S G.L.c. 260, § 2a provides: "Except as otherwise provided, actions of tort, ... shall 
be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues." 
179 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1856,329 N.E.2d 114. 
ISO Id. at 1863, 329 N.E.2d at 117. Accord, Pevoski v. Pevoski, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
2624, 2628, 385 N.E.2d 416, 418; Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1263, 
1278,302 N.E.2d 555, 564. 
lSI See note 178 supra. 
IS2 MASS. R. CIV. P. 15(c), provides: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in me 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth ... in 
the original pleading, the amendment (including an amendment changing a party) re-
lates back to the original proceeding." See SMITH & ZOBEL. 6 MASS. PRACTICE, § 15.9 
(1974). 
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ute of limitations. For example, in the event of an \ automobile acci-
dent between two cars in which the child of one driv~r is injured, the 
injured child could bring suit against the nonparent driver, but not 
against the parent driver because of the immunity ijar. If while that 
suit is pending the Court abrogates parent-child immunity, the plain-
tiff could then join the cause of action against the dover-parent even 
if the three year statute of limitations period had runf 183 
Moreover, in the parent-child area, there is furtijer evidence that 
the statute of limitations might not be an absolute ba~ to suits brought 
after the running of the statutory period. The statut¢ of limitations is 
tolled for minors until they reach majority .184 Conseq~ently, a retroac-
tive application of Sorensen, coupled with the tolling of the statute, 
would allow suits in which the cause of action accr~ed over twenty 
years ago. 185 Thus, the retroactive application of sorffisen could result 
in a substantial number of cases being brought becau e they either fall 
within the statute of limitations or they avoid the stat te by joinder or 
by tolling. . 
B. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
i 
Several policy considerations have been developed I to facilitate the 
determination of whether to apply any ne\\l judicial rule 
retroactively.ls6 These considerations are: (1) whether.! retroactivity will 
better promote the purpose of the holding;187 (2) wJt1ether there has 
been reliance upon the old rule;188 and (3) whether !retroactivity will 
have a deleterious effect on court administration.189 I 
The first factor to be considered in resolving the is~ue of retroactiv-
ity with respect to parent-child immunity is whetherl the purpose of 
the abrogation will be better promoted by a retroacti~e or prospective 
application.190 Simply stated, the purpose of Sorensen ,S to allow recov-
183 But see Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1263, 12 8 n.48, 302 N.E.2d 
555, 564 n.48, where the Court, in giving retroactive effect to the r cognition of a cause 
of action for loss of consortium, stated: "Any consortium claim hich, independently 
considered, has been barred by limitations, will not be revived b attempted joinder 
.... " A similar limitation on the right of joinder was not mentione in either Pevoski v. 
Pevoski, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2624, 2628, 358 N.E.2d 416, 418, r Bouchard v. De-
Gagne, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1863, 329 N.E.2d at 117. 
184 G.L.c. 260, § 7, provides: "If the person entitled thereto is a minor, ... when a 
right to bring an action first accrues, the action may be commen ed within the time 
herein before limited after the disability is removed." Even though he statute of IimiJa-
tions is tolled, a minor may not avoid the immunity bar by bri ging suit when he 
reaches majority because the immunity bar will apply to all inju ies which occurred 
while he was unemancipated. Cj Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67, 70 (Okla. 1964). 
185 See Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1970). , 
186 See Comment, Prospective Overruling and the Retroactrive Appli~ation in the Federal 
Courts, 71 YALEL.j. 907, 942 (1962). I 
187Id. at 942-44. I 
188Id. at 944-50. I 
189 /d. at 950-51. I 
190 See text and note at note 187 supra. 
I 
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ery for negligently inflicted injuries between family members. Such a 
purpose could best be effectuated by an application of the rule that 
would allow the greatest number of injured parties to recover. A re-
troactive application of Sorensen would seem to have that effect. 
A second policy consideration concerns whether the parties have in 
some way relied on the old immunity rule. 191 The reliance value of 
the old rule should not be measured solely in terms of the parties to a 
particular action presently before the court, but with respect to all fu-
ture potential parties who may be affected by the new rule. 192 Re-
liance on the parent-child immunity rule may be manifested in three 
ways. First, the parents may have shaped their conduct because of 
their knowledge that they were immune from suit. Second, the parties 
may have relied on immunity in determining their insurance needs. 
Third, insurers may have relied on the rule in setting rates and inves-
tigating and settling claims. 
In decisions concerning property rights or contracts, reliance is 
more explicit and direct. In these situations, the parties normally 
make an effort to find out the status of the law affecting the transac-
tion before entering into a contract or buying land. 193 As such, the 
parties' justified expectations regarding the effect of their actions 
should not be disappointed. 194 Where the conduct in question is neg-
ligent, however, it cannot reasonably be proposed that parties act neg-
ligently in reliance on the belief that immunity will protect them. 195 
For example, one does not drive carelessly because a family member 
is in the car and the driver knows he is immune from suit. Even if 
that were the case, it is not the type of conduct that courts should en-
courage. 
While parents probably do not rely on the presence of immunity in 
shaping their conduct, they may, however, rely on immunity in ob-
taining adequate liability insurance. 196 In the family immunity area, 
even this aspect of reliance is not a compelling reason for adopting a 
191 See text at note 188 supra. 
I •• See, e.g., Bouchard v. DeGagne, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1856,329 N.E.2d 114, where 
the Supreme Judicial Court, in determining the retroactive application of a rule 
establishing a landowner's duty of ordinary care to all lawful visitors, recognized that 
they had to measure the effect of a change on all landowners and noted: "The 
precautionary conduct of this or almost any other landowner almost certainly was not 
based on any appreciation of the subtle distinction between invitees, and social guests, 
and licensees." /d. at 1862-63,329 N.E.2d at 116. 
,.3 See Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y. 
U.L. REV. 631, 643 (1967). 
194 The reliance argument, when first enunciated, led some courts to believe that in 
order to justify prospective application of a rule, reliance upon the old rule must actu-
ally be shown. See, e.g., Wangler v. Harvey, 41 N.]. 277, 286, 196 A.2d 513, 518 (1963). 
But see Comment, Prospective Overruling and the Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 
71 YALE L.J. 907, 945-46 (1962) (in most cases reliance is not a factor because a major-
ity of people operate in blissful ignorance as to the actual state of the law). 
195 Haney v. Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 742 (Ky. 1964). 
196 See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11,.28, 163 
N.E.2d 89, 98 (1959). 
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prospective approach. The Court in Sorensen noted that recovery from 
an insurer will be the main objective of most inttafamilial suits. 197 
Where insurance coverage is inadequate or nonexist~nt, suit will prob-
ably not be brought.198 Realistically, the only i instance where 
an uninsured parent might be sued would be in an action for con-
tribution by a third party tortfeasor. 199 Taken alone, however, this in-
stance does not seem to be a sufficient basis for a finding of reliance 
by parents since these cases would be an exception to the general cir-
cumstances of the insurer being the real party in interest.2oo 
On the part of the insurer, however, there may have been substan-
tial, justified reliance. 201 This reliance may be maniifested in several 
ways. In setting rates to meet potential liability, ins~rance companies 
may have relied on the fact that no recovery could ~e had by an im-
mediate family member.202 Allowing recovery retroactively would 
probably cause insurance companies to compensate for the unex-
pected loss by increasing the cost of today's insuran¢e.203 Further, in-
surers may have failed adequately to investigate accidents involving a 
parent and child, or even if they have investigated may have failed to 
keep adequate records. 204 
The possibility of raising old and stale claims involves a third policy 
consideration, namely, the effect of retroactivity upon court adminis-
tration. 205 A retroactive application of abrogation o~ immunity in the 
parent-child area coupled with the tolling of the sta~ute of limitations 
197 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3678-79, 339 N.E.2d at 914. 
198 [d. at 3677, 339 N.E.2d at 913. 
199 See discussion of effect of contribution infra at note 219. 
200Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3678-79, 339 N.E.2d at 914. 
, 
, 
201 In some instances the reasonableness of the insurer's reliance on a common law 
rule is questionable if there have been numerous exceptions to or circumventions of the 
rule. The Supreme Judicial Court found this to be the case in Bouchard v. DeGagne, 
1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1862-63, 329 N.E.2d at 116-17, where the Court gave retroac-
tive effect to the rule requiring a landowner to exercise reasonable care to all lawful vis-
itors. In the family immunity area, Massachusetts has recognized t· nly one exception to 
the immunity rule-namely, allowing recovery under the wrong ul death statute by a 
mother against her son while she was acting as administratrix f the father's estate. 
Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 300, 25 N.E.2d 766, 768 (194 ). Thus, the insurer's 
reliance on parent-child immunity seems more reasonable than w s the similar reliance 
on the old rule in Bouchard. 
202 Darrow v. Hanover Township, 58 N.]. 410, 416, 278 A.2d 200, 203 (1971). It 
should also be noted that children are already governed by their parents' no-fault in-
surance benefits. See C.L. c. 90, § 34a. See also Kenney & McCarthy, "No-Fault in Mas-
sachusetts Chapter 670, Acts of 1970: A Synopsis and Analysis, 55 MASS. LAW Q. 23, 26 
(1970). It is only when injuries exceed the amount allowed under no-fault that the in-
surer could actually be relying on immunity. 
203 Schwartz v. U.S. Rubber Corp., 112 N.]. Super. 595, 599, 272 A.2d 310, 313 
(1970). This is an especially important consideration in the parent-child area where the 
combination of retroactivity and the tolling of the statute of limit,tions would result in 
substantially older claims being brought. See text at notes 178-185 kupra. 
204 Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1970); Felderhpff v. Felderhoff, 473 
S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971). ' 
205 See text a.t note 189 supra. 
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for minors could result in claims being brought for actions that have 
arisen over the previous twenty years. 206 The total effect of these 
claims suddenly being brought would place a substantial burden on 
the judicial system. Old claims, brought under retroactive application 
of the new immunity rule, would depend upon investigative reports 
that may not be thorough due to past reliance on immunity. As a re-
sult, the courts may be inundated with stale and meritless claims, some 
of which might well succeed.207 
In light of these three policy considerations, the final question is 
how to balance the purpose of Sorensen which supports retroactive ap-
plication and the considerations of reliance and judicial administration 
which militate against it. In determining how much weight to give the 
possible reliance value of the old rule, several factors must be consid-
ered. 
First, while the purpose of the abrogation of immunity is to give 
children the same right to legal protection and redress that others 
enjoy, 208 the abrogation was based on a finding by the Court that a 
total immunity is no longer necessary in today's society.209 Such a 
finding would seem to make the argument in favor of retroactivity 
less compelling because in the parent-child area a retroactive abroga-
tion of immunity could result in very old claims being brought relat-
ing to injuries that may have occurred when immunity was still neces-
sary for family life. 210 
In terms of reliance, while parents may not have relied on immun-
ity in determining either their conduct or insurance needs, the insur-
ers may have relied on immunity in determining their potential liabil-
ity in order to establish their rates, as well as relying on immunity to 
set the manner in which they investigated claims. This type of reliance 
ordinarily might not be sufficient to turn the balance in favor of 
prospectivity. However, in the parent-child area, the fact that the stat-
ute of limitations is tolled during a child's minority increases the 
number of claims that may be brought under a retroactive application 
of Sorensen. 211 Such an increase may be enough to give retroactivity 
the substantial impact which the Court has found to be lacking in the 
interspousal area. 212 
Finally, one must consider the effect of opening the courts to claims 
206 See text at notes 184-185 supra. 
207 Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1970). 
208 See note 64 supra. 
209 The Court stated: "We believe that an absolute parental immunity to actions in 
negligence is not consistent with contemporary conditions and is no longer required by 
the necessities of modern family life." Sorensen, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3364-65, 33 
N.E.2d at 908-09. 
210 Among the factors concerning family life that have changed in the last twenty 
years are the widespread existence of insurance, the greater use of the automobile and 
the corresponding increase in the number of accidents. 
211 See text at notes 205-07 supra. 
212 Pevoski v. Pevoski, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2624, 2628, 358 N.E.2d 416, 418. 
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that have arisen over the last twenty years. Only the most compelling 
reasons for retroactivity can justify such an additiona~ burden on the 
courts. While a retroactive application of Sorensen th~oretically would 
open the courthouse doors Ito very old claims, it seerps doubtful as a 
practical matter whether many parents will undertake the financial 
burden of pursuing such claims. Just as the judicial system depends 
upon judge and jury to weed out fraudulent and collusive claims,213 
they may also be depended upon to weed out meritless claims and 
may be expected to be particularly vigilant when a very old claim is 
brought which suffers from witnesses' poor memories and the fact 
that no investigation was made at the time of the injury. I 
The effect of retroactivity on insurers due to thelr reliance upon 
the old rule will also be minimal for the same reasons; While their po-
tential liability may be great if it is allowed to spani the last twenty 
years, as a practical matter, the incidence of old clainis being brought 
will probably be slight and therefore does not merit a blanket denial 
of recovery to all parties whose injuries arose prior to Sorensen. 214 
III. THE EFFECT OF THE ABROGATION OF IMMUNITY ON THE RIGHT TO RECOVER 
MEDICAL EXPENSES 
The abrogation of family immunity focuses attentio, upon the right 
to recover medical expenses within the family. hi a sUlit by a minor or 
a married woman, the cause of action is split betweenl the right to re-
cover for medical expenses and the right to recov~r for personal 
injuries.215 Generally, the former belongs to the fat~er or husband, 
i 
213 See text at note 27 supra. 
214 If the Court determines that the potential for bringing very old claims under a re-
troactive application of Sorensen constitutes sufficient impact to distinguish the parent-
child area from the result reached in Pevoski, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2628, 358 N.E.2d 
at 418, concen;)ing interspousal suits, an alternative to an absolute prospective or re-
troactive application of Sorensen would be to apply the decision in Sorensen from the 
date of the injury rather than from the date of the decision. I~sorensen this would 
allow claims to be brought which arose after May 29, 1971. See greed Statement for 
Plaintiff-Appellant at 4. This would limit the retroactive impact of Sorensen to a period 
of less than five years and would avoid the hardship of a prospect"ve application which 
would deny recovery to parties whose injuries arose after the injur in the decided case 
but before the Court's decision. In Sorensen, immunity was abolish d because the Court 
was ready to reexamine the principles of immunity in light of the c nditions of modern 
life. In light of that circumstance, it seems unfair to deny recovery in cases arising after 
the date of the injury in Sorensen because it was the Sorensen fact situation rather than 
some other case which provided the basis for the Court's reexamination of immunity. 
For eX<J,mple, if the day after jessica Sorensen was injured another accident involving a 
parent and child occurred and suit was brought, it would be unfair to deny recovery to 
the second plaintiff because the Sorensen case was the first such fact situation to reach 
the Supreme judicial Court. Two jurisdictions have applied the abwgation of immunity 
to injuries arising after the date of the injury in the case being de~ided. Rigdon v. Rig-
don, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1971); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 
(Tex. 1973). See generally R. KEETON, VENTURING TO DOjUSTICE 3~38 (1969). 
215 "[Tlhe law splits the cause of action arising from the persona injury to the minor 
or married woman and gives each the right to recover for person I injuries, and gives 
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and the latter to the injured party.216 The father or husband is given 
the right to recover medical expenses because as head of the house-
hold he is legally responsible for their payment.217 Where the cause of 
action is so divided and the party who may recover medical expenses 
is also the party who is responsible for the injuries, medical expenses 
will be reduced by the amount of the father's or spouse's 
negligence.218 The practical effect of such a reduction is that the 
amount of money available for an injured party's ,medical expenses in 
an action against a negligent father or spouse may be diminished or 
eliminated entirely.219 If such a result does not obtain, a second prob-
the parent or husband, as the case may be, the right to recover for medical or nursing 
expenses, .... " Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279,281,52 N.E.2d 576, 577 (1943). 
216 [d. 
217 The husband's legal responsibility for his wife's medical expenses was most re-
cently cited in Dane v. Cormier, 362 Mass. 853, 853, 285 N .E.2d 451, 452 (1972). Accord, 
Arant v. Stover, 307 F. Supp. 144, 148 (D.S.C. 1969); Janke v.Janke, 292 Minn. 296, 
299-300195 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (1972). 
218 See Dane v. Cormier, 362 Mass. 853, 853, 285 N.E.2d 451, 452 (1972) (husband's 
recovery of his wife's medical expenses was precluded by his negligence). Today under 
comparative negligence, G.L.c. 231, § 85, recovery would be reduced in an amount cor-
responding to the husband's negligence, as long as he was not more than 50%, negli-
gent. 
219 The abrogation of immunity raises several interesting issues concerning the right 
to contribution among joint tortfeasors. Ordinarily, as contribution only concerns the 
rights among joint tortfeasors it has no effect on the right of an injured plaintiff to re-
cover. See G.L.c. 231b, § 1. When, however, the plaintiff is the child or the spouse of 
one of the tortfeasors, an action for contribution may determine indirectly how much 
of an award will be available for, the injured party, and in some cases whether an action 
will be brought at all. An example of a case where a finding that the parent was con-
tributorily negligent resulted in a reduction of recovery for medical expenses is Thoreson 
v. Milwaukee & Surburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis.2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 795 (1972), which 
involved a suit for personal injuries brought against a bus company on behalf of a child 
who was struck by a bus and suffered brain damage. The child was awarded $105,000 
for pain and suffering and impairment of future earning capacity, and his mother was 
awarded $86,000 for past and future medical expenses. The child's mother was im-
pleaded for contribution by the bus company. Negligence was apportioned between the 
mother (40%) and the bus company (60%). [d. at 233, 201 N.W.2d at 747. As a result, 
the mother's award of medical expenses was reduced by 40%. The bus company also 
received a judgment against the mother for $42,000 (40% of the child's award against 
the bus company). [d. Such a result has two possible effects on the child's recovery. It 
reduces the total amount available for the child's recovery. It also may prevent parents 
who have little or no insurance from bringing actions for fear of their liability in con-
tribution. 
The Court's holding in Sorensen, which limited recovery to the amount of the insur-
ance policy, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3665, 339 N.E.2d at 916, may also affect contribu-
tion rights. In the Sorensen case, there was another driver involved. If the Court applies 
the insurance limitation to the right of contribution, the other driver will be solely liable 
for any amount recovered by the child. For example, in the Sorensen case, there was 
another driver against whom suit was brought. Recovery by the child against the father 
was limited to the amount of the father's insurance policy ($10,000). If that limitation 
also applied to actions for contribution by the other driver, once the insurer paid the 
policy limits to the child, there would be nothing left for a joint tortfeasor to recover. If 
the Court views the insurance limitation as applicable only to actions between parent 
and child, thus allowing contribution in excess of the insurance policy limits, it would 
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lem arises. If full recovery by the injured party is allowed while the 
legal duty to pay medical expenses still rests with the father or spouse, 
the father or spouse may be obligated to pay the injured party for 
medical expenses as well as the medical bills themselves. The problem 
is therefore one of allowing recovery directly by the injured party 
without exposing the injuring party to the risk of having to pay the 
expenses twice. ' 
A child has no recognized right in Massachusetts to recover any 
medical expenses.220 In a suit against a negligent father, therefore, 
total recovery of medical expenses may be denied. U~der the Sorensen 
view of parent-child actions, where both parties are: looking toward 
the insurance to provide a fund to aid in the I injured child's 
recovery,221 such a result may substantially limit the i child's ability to 
obtain the medical care necessary to make a full recovery. It seems 
unfair that insurance which the parent has purchased for such a cir-
cumstance may be made available to help a stranger but not the 
insured's own child. In order to mitigate the harshr:i.ess of this rule, 
one alternative might be to allow either parent to recpver medical ex-
penses. Payment of these expenses, while nominally pelonging to the 
father as head of the household, is in reality a burden on the family 
exchequer and as such either parent should be allowed to recover. 
Under such an alternative, it would be necessary tq insure that the 
nonnegligent parent be entitled to recover. Therefore, the ability to 
make a full recovery would depend first on there bdng another par-
ent to collect the expenses and on the nonnegligent parent being 
knowledgeable enough to incur the obligation.222 Another approach 
would be to give the child the right to collect! future medical 
expenses.223 Awarding a child his future medical expenses would in-
sure that a child receives the necessary medical ca~e because there 
would be funds available to pay for it.224 There is no danger that a 
seem that the Court's reliance on an insurance fund to pay the~'udgment, and thus 
prevent family discord, is misplaced. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 36 8-79, 339 N.E.2d at 
914. There have been no cases that have dealt with the policy as ects of contribution 
arising from intrafamilial suits. Whether contribution will be all owe in a particular case 
has depended solely upon whether the plaintiff would have had a cause of action 
against the family member who is being sued for contribution. Compare Thoreson v. 
Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis.2d 231, 245-47, 201 N.W.2d 745, 753 
(1972), with Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 485-86 233 N.W.2d 46, 49 
( 1975). 
220 Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 281, 52 N.E.2d 576, 577 (1943). See generally, 
W. PROSSER. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 890 & n.62 4th ed. 1971). 
221 See text at notes 23-24 supra. 
222 See text at notes 230-232 infra. 
mSee, e.g., Clarke v. Eighth Ave. R.R., 238 N.Y. 246, 250,144 N.E. 516, 517 (1924). 
224 "A recovery in the child's action for a personal injury, for prqspective medical ser-
vices, where the fund recovered is usually preserved through a guardian or in other 
ways, will be most likely to secure such services when needed." Cu~ing v. Brooklyn City 
R., 109 N.Y. 95, 100, 16 N.E. 65, 67 (1888). In Sorensen, the Court stated "In case of a 
settlement or award, it would be most appropriate that a guardian ad litem be ap-
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child will be denied medical care by allowing a parent to recover past 
expenses because these expenses relate to care which the child has al-
ready received. 
The award for future expenses could be deposited in an account 
for the child and funds could only be withdrawn with the approval of 
the court. 225 Under this approach a parent who actually pays for the 
future medical expenses may be reimbursed for that amount from the 
fund. 226 Payment may also be had directly from the fund itself. Either 
method would avoid the problem of having a child's full recovery de-
pend upon whether the tortfeasor was a stranger or a parent and 
would prevent the parent from having to pay medical expenses twice. 
Just as the earlier consideration of the liability between husband 
and wife focused on the legal implications of a woman's marital status, 
a woman's ability to incur and discharge her financial obligations has 
also depended upon whether she was married. Under the common 
law, the entire cause of action for injuries to a married woman be-
longed to her husband. 227 The Married Woman's Act gave married 
women the right to recover for their personal injuries but the hus-
band, as "nominal and legal head" of the family, remained liable for 
any medical expenses.228 A wife, however, may recover her own past 
medical expenses if she makes herself liable for them229 and is enti-
tled to recover future medical expenses in any case.230 Therefore, 
when a husband negligently causes injury to his wife, a full recovery 
of medical expenses may still be had provided that the parties have 
the foresight to have the wife incur the obligation to pay the medical 
bills. 231 It would seem that once the wife has agreed to incur these 
expenses the husband's liability ceases. 232 
pointed to protect and maintain the proceeds of the settlement or award for the benefit 
of the injured child." 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3679 n.15, 339 N .E.2d at 914 n.15. 
225 See Clarke v. Eighth Ave. R.R., 238 N.Y. 246, 250,144 N.E. 516, 517 (1924). 
226 See id. at 252, 144 N.E. at 518. 
227 Thibeault v. Poole, 283 Mass. 480, 483-84, 186 N.E. 632, 634 (1933). 
228 [d. 
229 Dane v. Cormier, 362 Mass. 853, 853, 285 N.E. 2d 451,451 (1972). 
230 Cassidy v. Constantine, 269 Mass. 56, 59, 168 N.E. 169, 170-71 (1929). 
231 The New Jersey Supreme Court found this approach unsatisfactory in Patusco v. 
Prince Macaroni, Inc., 50 N.J. 365, 235 A.2d 465 (1967), on the ground that it was ir-
relevant who incurred the medical expenses. In that case, the husband was found neg-
ligent and the wife was allowed to recover full medical expenses from another tort-
feasor regardless of who actually incurred them. "Under this view, only the uninformed 
would make the mistake of using the husband's credit or resources." [d. at 372, 235 
A.2d at 469. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court specifically declined to follow 
Patusco in Dane v. Cormier, 362 Mass. 853, 853, 285 N.E.2d 451, 452 (1972) and found 
that the husband's negligence precluded his recovery of the wife's medical expenses and 
the wife could only recover upon a showing that she actually incurred them. 
232 See Bell v. Proctor, 92 Ga. App. 759, 90 S.E.2d 84 (1955): 
[Ilt is elementary that the husband is responsible, generally, under the law, for 
such items of medical expenses as are shown in the instant case. This rule is not 
applicable where such expenses are charged to the wife at her request and she 
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One's ability to take advantage of this situation, h6wever, rests with 
the state of one's legal knowledge for the wife must actually incur the 
debt herself.233 The problem in interspousal suits, I therefore, is not 
one of allowing the wife to recover medical expensesl, but one of mak-
ing that recovery turn on the wife's foresight and ~nowledge of the 
law so that she actually incurs the expenses. This is not a realistic ap-
proach. When an injury occurs, the emphasis is on pbtaining medical 
help rather than establishing the wife's obligation t~ pay for medical 
services. The concern in this area, then, should be focused upon allow-
ing the wife to recover her medical expenses and not upon which 
spouse has the legal obligation to pay them. In mosF cases if the wife 
recovers her medical expenses, the money will be uSfd to pay medical 
bills and the husband's liability for his wife's medical bills will as a 
practical matter cease. Once the wife recovers these expenses, the 
husband's legal responsibility for those expenses shQuld also cease. If 
the wife may expressly assume liability for her medi~al bills,234 her ac-
tion to recover medical expenses should be viewed by the court as an 
assumption of those responsibilities and the husban«l's liability should 
cease. 
In light of the problems and considerations just mentioned, the 
most viable approach in the case of a child would be to place any 
award for medical expenses in a trust fund that wQuld only be used 
for medical expenses. Such an arrangement woul~ insure that the 
funds were put to their intended use. In the case of a wife, she would 
be allowed to recover her medical expenses regardlelss of whether she 
has previously acted to assume these expenses. Oncd she recovers her 
medical expenses, the husband's responsibility should cease. 
While the abrogation of parent-child and interspousal immunity did 
not create the problems that exist when medical expenses are recov-
ered by someone other than the i~ured party,235 it ~ill serve to focus 
the courts' attention on such problems because the abrogation of im-
munity will undoubtedly result in more suits brought against parents 
and spouses. The recovery of medical expenses by a Iparent or spouse, 
and the corresponding reduction in recovery when tpat party is negli-
gent seems contrary to the intent of the Court in Sorensen and Lewis to 
give children and spouses the same rights of recovery that others en-
joy.236 This right of recovery includes not only the Iright to maintain 
promises to pay such expenses herself instead of her husband ~aYing them. [d. at 
765, 90 S.E.2d at 88. 
233 See Cassidy v. Constantine, 269 Mass. 56, 59, 168 N.E. 169, 1 1 (1929). 
234 See text at note 229-230 supra. 
23. The problem was created by splitting the cause of action between the injured 
party and the parent or spouse. This practice arose long b~fore immunity was 
abolished. See e.g., Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 270,281, 52 N.~.2d 576, 577 (1943). 
The abrogation of immunity accentuates the problem because it allows suit where the 
parent or spouse is the only tortfeasor and thus even under comparative negligence 
there would be a 100% reduction in recovery of medical expenses. See note 218 supra. 
236 See note 64 supra. 
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an action against a parent or spouse, but also to make a full monetary 
recovery, including medical expenses, for the injuries incurred. 
CONCLUSION 
Massachusetts has wisely decided to abolish the common law im-
munities that bar recovery for tortious injury between parent and 
child and husband and wife. While the limitation to injuries arising 
out of automobile accidents is justified by the Court's reluctance to 
decide anything more than that which was presently before it, there 
will undoubtedly be parties in the future who will seek to apply the 
reasoning in Sorensen and Lewis to nonautomobile injuries. When the 
Court is confronted with such a case, it will be necessary to balance 
the policies of Sorensen and Lewis in favor of recovery by injured par-
ties against the possibility of excessive judicial interference in the fam-
ily. The major difficulty in achieving such a balance is tQ. develop a 
guide for recovery broad enough to protect the rights of injured par-
ties but narrow enough not to encroach upon activities unique to the 
family. The New York courts seem to have achieved the proper bal-
ance by focusing on the importance of the family relationship to the 
conduct in question. Massachusetts should follow the New York ap-
proach and should allow recovery except where the conduct in ques-
tion would not have arisen but for the family relationship. Such a 
standard for recovery can be applied to both parent-child and in-
terspousal suits. 
The Court also reserved for future consideration the question of 
whether the holding in Sorensen should be made retroactive or pros-
pective. A retroactive application would allow a greater number to re-
cover. On the other hand, since the statute of limitations is tolled for 
suits by minors, a retroactive application of Sorensen would allow very 
old and possibly meritless claims to be brought. On balance, however, 
it is submitted that the court should apply Sorensen retroactively as it 
did with Lewis. 237 The actual effect in terms of the number of cases 
brought is not sufficient to deny recovery to everyone whose injuries 
arose prior to Sorensen. If the Court is convinced that retroactivity 
would result in an inundation of old claims because of the tolling of 
the statute of limitations, it could, as an alternative, apply Sorensen 
from the date of the injury. This alternative would avoid very old 
claims from being brought yet would allow recovery to those people 
whose injuries arose after the date of the injury in Sorensen but before 
the Court's decision. 
Finally, suits by a child against a parent or a wife against her hus-
band for tortiously inflicted injuries will raise questions concerning 
the right of a parent or husband to recover medical expenses for an 
237 See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2628, 358 N.E.2d at 418. See text and notes at note 
176 supra. 
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injured child or wife. The ability to be fully compeqsated for injuries 
should not be lessened by the fact that the tortfeasor was a parent or 
spouse. Both children and wives should be allowed to make a full re-
covery of medical expenses with the understandin,g that children's 
awards for medical expenses be placed in a trust and used solely for 
that purpose. A wife's recovery of her medical expenses should be 
viewed as her assumption of the obligation to pay those expenses, 
thus relieving the husband of future liability for payment of those ex-
penses. . 
JCDlTH A. MALONE 
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